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ABSTRACT
Most books and articles written on the philosophy
of George Berkeley have treated his empiricism.

Yet he

himself explicitly states that his principal concern is
with spiritual substance.

The purpose of this thesis is

to consider his doctrine on spiritual substance in relation
to his empiricism and to try to determine whether or not
these two parts of his philosophy do fit together.
In the introductory chapter the basic tenets of
his erapiricisraj namely* the rejection of abstract ideas,
the esse eat peroipi principle, and the rejection of
material substance, are analysed.

These three tenets are

presupposed in his discussion of spiritual substance and
hence are a necessary preliminary.

Although the arguments

advanced to prove these teachings are not satisfactory,
nevertheless these three tenets do blend into one har
monious position.
The existence of spiritual substances is considered
next.

Berkeley merely asserts the existence of self as a

spiritual substance without proving it.

The existence of

other finite spirits is dependent on this assertion and
consequently is not proven.

Finally, the existence of

God depends on the esse est perclpl principle which in
turn depends on the existence of God.
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Then the activities of spiritual substances,
namely, sensing, imagining, thinking and willing are
treated,

Ilor© there are many inconsistencies,

Berkeley

does not make clear the precise nature of each faculty
nor whether the faculties are to be distinguished from
the substance in which they reside.
It would appear that Berkeley* s empiricism and
his doctrine on spiritual substanoe, which derives from
his Christian faith, are not compatible.

Following the

basiq tenets of his empirical philosophy, Berkeley should
logically have rejected spiritual substance.

Since he did

not he Is faced with problems which his philosophy cannot
resolve.

As a result his empiricism and his Christian

doctrine on spiritual substance remain as separate parts
in a philosophy without unity.
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PREFACE

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the
notion of spiritual substance in the philosophy of George
Berkeley.

In order to arrive at a clear understanding of the

meaning of spiritual substance for Berkeley, it will he neces
sary first to explain certain basic tenets of M s pMlosophy.
Accordingly the initial chapter deals with the rejection of
abstract ideas and of material substance as well as the devel
opment of the esse est percipi. T M s serves to introduce the
more positive aspects of his thought having to do with the ex
istence and nature of spiritual substance, self as opposed to
other finite spirits, and God the infinite Spirit.

Following

this is a study of the Berkeleyan psychology and episteraology
of the operations which spiritual substances are said to possess.
Is t M s doctrine at home in the philosophy of Berkeley?
Does it not seem paradoxical that an empiricist, who rejects
material substance, should at the same time maintain a doctrine
of spiritual substance?
heart of t M s thesis.

This is the problem which is at the

Although it pervades the entire thesis,

t M s problem is considered formally in the concluding chapter.
The critics have not dealt very extensively with the doctrine
on spiritual substance, even though it is of prime importance
to the Anglican Bishop of Cloyne, an avowed eneay of skeptics
and atheists.
ill
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In dealing with this problem, recourse has been made
primarily to Berkeley’s own text.

The pertinent doctrines

are contained chiefly in the Principles of Human Knowledge
(1710) and the Three Dialogues Between Hylaa and Philonous
(1713).

Considerable relevant material is to be found also

in the Philosophical Commentaries (1707-8) and Siris (1744).
Other works, such as Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher (1732),
De Motu (1721), the Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision (1709),
and his private correspondence and sermons, have been used only
to a very minor extent because they contain very little matter
germane to this topic.

Unfortunately an intended work on spir

itual substance, which was to have been Part II of the Princi
ples, was lost in manuscript form by Berkeley himself.

And as

Berkeley wrote in his second letter to Samuel Johnson, the
American Philosopher, ”1 never had leisure since to do so dis1

agreeable a thing as writing twice on the same subject.'* There
is then a difficulty, arising from this regrettable paucity of
material, in being certain of Berkeley’s exact position on some
issues.
Secondary sources have provided some illuminating sug
gestions, as well as a better general understanding of Berke
ley’s philosophy.

For the most part material from the sec

ondary sources has not been included in the body of the dis
sertation, but rather has been restricted to the footnotes.
The standard works on Berkeley have been consulted, as have
1------------------------------------------------------------

Luce-Jessop, Vol. II, p. 282
iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

more specialized studies pertaining to the present topic.
Such specialized studies are, however, not very plentiful.
Finally the more recent periodical articles on Berkeley have
been employed.
All references to the writings of Bishop Berkeley are
from The Works of Greorge Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne. edited by
A. A. luce and T. 1. dessop, (London, Thomas Helson and Sons
Ltd., 1948-1957}.

Berkeley almost invariably followed the

practice of numbering his paragraphs, and accordingly refer
ences have been given first to his own paragraph number and
then in brackets to the volume and page of the Luce-Jessop
edition, e.g. Brine., Part I, par. 10, (II, 45) refers to par
agraph 10 of Part I of the Principles, which appears on page
45 of Volume II of the Luee-Jessop edition.
The Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Phllonous do not
have any paragraph division, and only the reference to the luce
Jessop edition has been given, e.g. M a i ., II, 233, refers to
page 233 of Volume II of this edition.

The Philosophical

Commentaries are referred to as P.O. and Alciphron as Ale. In
reference to the letters or sermons, the number of the letter
or sermon is given, and then the volume and page of the LueeJessop edition in brackets.

I wish to express my thanks to Dr. John Deck who has
very carefully examined my manuscript and offered many help
ful suggestions.

My thanks are due also to Mr. Patrick Flood

who has been instrumental in imparting to me the background
v
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knowledge of modem philosophy without which I could not
have undertaken this dissertation.

I wish to acknowledge

my indebtedness also to the members of the Philosophy De
partments of the University of St. Michael’s College and of
Assumption University of Windsor, who have been responsible
for my philosophical instruction.

Finally a word of appre

ciation to Miss Pauline Stellman and Mrs. Helen Haberer for
the many hours they have spent in typing this dissertation.
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I

BASIC TEHBTS OF REHKBLEY*S PHILOSOPHY
To begin in mediae res may indeed be admirable in
the epic but it is hardly to be recommended in a philo
sophical dissertation.

Accordingly the discussion shall

begin with certain basic positions in the philosophy of
Berkeley, which must be understood before spiritual sub
stance can be treated.

The rejection of abstract ideas

must be taken as the starting point in any consideration of
Berkeley’s thought.

For he invokes this doctrine, which he

believes he has firmly established, throughout the whole
gamut of his work,

Appropriately then, he deals with the

problem of abstract ideas in the "Introduction" to his major
philosophical work, The Principles of Human Knowledge.
Berkeley begins by observing that abstract ideas
occupy a considerable amount of time said writings among phi
losophers.

These philosophers among whom "the scholastics"

r

---------------------------------

Princ. Introd. par. 1-25 (II, 25-40). The "First
Draft of the Introduction to the Principles" is found in
Vol. II, p. 121-145. The two versions are substantially the
same, as the editors, A. A. luce and T. B. Jessop, point out,
"Compared with the printed Introduction, the draft neither
adds nor omits anything of substance." (II, 117) Vide etlam
0. J. Wamock, Berkeley (Pelican Books, Baltimore, 1553),
p. 58.
1
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2

and Locke^ are mentioned, tell us we can form abstract ideas
of qualities such as extension, colour etc., even of man,
body and "more compound beings’* of this sort.

But Berkeley

sardonically adds, "Whether others have this wonderful fac
ulty of abstracting their ideas they best can tells for my
self I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or repre
senting to my self the ideas of those particular things I have
3

perceived and of variously compounding and dividing them.**

Here we have a lucid statement of Berkeley’s own posi
tion on forming abstract ideas.

He only knows, or has ideas

of, concrete things which he perceived through his senses. He
can combine these ideas and form ideas of such things as phoe
nix or unicorn of which he actually has no sense impression.
But he denies that he can form an idea of colour, man, etc.,
which abstracts from all particulars.
be of some colour, size, age, etc.

The idea of man must

Berkeley seems to make no

distinction between an idea and a sense image.

He does, it

is true, distinguish objects of sense and objects of imagi
nation, which we shall treat at length in the third chapter,
but this distinction is not relevant to our present discus
sion.

A sense image of man perspicuously must be of a certain
g---------------------------------------------------------------

Berkeley usually ealls them ’’the Schoolmen" and
refers to their abstraction in the Brine., Introd. par, 17.
(II, 35)? to locks, ibid., par. 11-IT, (II, W W ).
3
Brine.. Introd., par. 10, (II, 29), of. N.T.V.
par. 122,"H7“220TT"^
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3

colour, size, shape, etc., but it might be argued that an
intellectual idea can prescind from these sense impressions
and form an abstract idea.

Berkeley does not hare an answer

to an objection based on this distinction of sense image and
idea because he appear® to be completely unaware of such a
distinction.

4

He does, however, admit that we can abstract in one
sense,-*that is, we can separate some particular parts or
qualities from others with which they are united in some
object.

But this is only possible if they may really exist

thus separated.

Such a form of abstraction, as is patent,

is not really a concession on Berkeley's part, for it does
not in any way involve the forming of abstract ideas.
In direct refutation of Locke, Berkeley challenges
the reader to try and form an idea of a triangle which is
"neither oblique, nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural,
7

nor sealenon, but all and none of these at once."
1

Clearly

-------------------------------------

Cf. J. J. Laky, A Study of Berkeley's Philosophy
in the Light of the Philosophy 6f~lh. Miomas Aquinas.
^Washington, Catholic University of America Press, 1950 ).
Laky points out, p. 121, that Berkeley "confuses imagination
and intellect."
5
Prlnc., Introd., par. 10, (II, 29).
6

This is what is called abstraction in some intell
igence tests.
7.
Brine.. Introd.. par. 13, (II, 32f). The Text In
Locke reads as follows: "Does it not reuire some pains and
skill to fora the general idea of a triangle? (Which is
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4
Berkeley confuses idea in this case with visual image which
obviously cannot abstract from the particulars enumerated.
Looked at, however, from the point of view of Locke who
admits the difficulty of framing abstract ideas, and who
states that this process involves the putting together of
inconsistent parts, Berkeley’s criticism is indeed telling.

8

Locke, it is true, remains vague on the meaning of framing
an abstract idea, but unless he too confuses image and con
cept, then it is difficult to make any sense of his doctrine
of abstract ideas.
An obvious objection to this rejection of abstract
ideas is the assertion that it would destroy all science.
When, for example, you take a particular triangle in Geometry
and prove some theorem using it, you would not be able to gen
eralize and make a universal judgment.

Berkeley parries this

attack by saying that when we use a particular triangle, it
is used as an example; we do not attend to the particulars of
the triangle in the proof, and hence the proof will stand for
all triangles.

Bar we can consider a figure merely as trian

gular without considering the size of the angles or lines.^
yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult.)
For it must be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equi
lateral, equicrural, nor sealenon, but all or none of these
at once,11 John Locke, An 5ssay Concerning Human Underatanding
(Oxford, Clarendon, 18^) X. C. Frazer ed.T^W. IY, Ch. 7 ,
sec. 9, (Vol. II, p. 274).
8
Ibid.
9
Princ., Introd., par. 16, (II, 35).
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5
We can abstract thus far, Berkeley admits, but this is not
to frame Han abstract general inconsistent idea of a triangleH.
But what, one may ask, is the difference between considering
a figure as triangular Mid framing an abstract idea of a tri
angle?

Surely to consider a figure as triangular is to ab

stract from the particulars of shape, size, colour, etc., and
hence to frame an abstract idea,^
The source of the prevailing notion of abstract ideas,
Berkeley thinks, is language.

Bach word is said to have one

precise and settled signification and the only purpose of
language is the communication of ideas. 11 ait as Berkeley
points out,

12

it is not necessary that significant names

excite in the understanding the ideas for which they stand
--------- I S ------------------------------------------------------------

Wamock agrees with Berkeley on this issue "We
may agree with him j.Berkeley] that a general discourse about
lines may refer to a particular line used as an example,
and need not be conceived to be about some entity other than
actual lines, an ’abstract line’ or the ’abstract idea* of
Line.* p. 71, What Warnock says is quite true, but he misses
the point to some extent. Abstract ideas are a means of
knowing things, but not what we know. Science does deal
with real things but this does not exclude the employment of
abstract ideas.
11
Locke, Essay, Bk. Ill, Ch. 10, sec. 23, (Vol. II,
p. 142 ), M,..the ends of language in our discourse with others,
being chiefly these threes First, to make known one man’s
thought or ideas to another: Secondly, to do it with as much
ease and quickness as is possibles and, Thirdly, thereby to
convey the knowledge of things.**
12

Brine». Introd., par, 20, (II, 37).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6
every time they are used.

For example, in Algebra, we do

not always need to advert to the particular quantity marked
by a certain letter used as a symbol.
Moreover, for Berkeley, the communication of ideas
is not the chief nor the only end of language.

Other ends

would include the raising of some passion or emotion, the
exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting of the
mind in some particular disposition.
no need for abstract ideas.

In such eases there is

In this argument, Berkeley has

only tried to show that abstract ideas are not as important
as some thinkers would have us believe.

It is not, nor is

it intended to be, an apodictic demonstration that there are
no abstract ideas.
*What created intelligence will pretend to conceive
that which Sod cannot cause to be?

How it is on all hands

agreed, that nothing abstract or general can be made really
to exist, whence it should seem to follow, that it cannot
have so much as an ideal existence in the understanding.*

13

This argument of Berkeley against abstract idea manifests
a rather confused idea of being.

When he speaks of God

causing something to be, Berkeley seems to mean to be a
particular concrete thing. Consequently, to say that Sod
cannot cause it to be in this sense, is no argument against
.
53
"KLrst Draft of the Introduction*, II, 125,
Vide supra, note 1, page 1,
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7
the reality of abstract ideas.

Against the ideal existence

of abstract ideas in the mind, Berkeley does not seem to
give any reason in this passage, although perhaps his
equating of thing and idea is foreshadowed.

In that case,

the real existence of the concrete thing and its ideal
existence in the mind would be identical.

But more of this

identity later.
**I approve of this axiom of the schoolemen nihil
est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu,

I wish

they had stuck to it it had never taught them the Doctrine
of Abstract I d e a s . T h e way in which this axiom Is under
stood by Berkeley constitutes an objection to the doctrine
of abstract ideas.

Once again this is due to having the

product of the intellect identical with the sense image. The
intellect does not go beyond this Image to a concept which
is free of such sense limitations; hence the axiom thus in
terpreted supports Berkeley’s rejection of abstract ideas.
u ----------------------------------------------------------

P.O. par. 779* (I* 94). The punctuation, capit
alization etc. are irregular in this early fragmentary work.
Wild points out that we cannot quote isolated sections of
the P.O. as representing Berkeley’s views, John Wild,
George Berkeley: A Study of His Life and Philosophy
"(Sambridge, Mass.,~Harvard~Wnfversi*ty tress’, l93'S5,P - 14.
A. A. luce also gives this warning, although he points out
that *the final views expressed in these notebooks are, I
think in entire agreement with the published doctrine of
the Principles’*. A. A. Luce, Berkeley1s Imaaterialism.
(Nelson and Sons, London, 1945), p. 6 .
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8

Berkeley also claims the common man to his side.
”fhe generality of men which are simple and illiterate

IB

never pretend to abstract notions#” ^ He does not make any
effort to back up this statement except in terms of Locke’s
thought#

Por Locke had said that abstract ideas are diffiig
cult to frame and require study and effort,
so, as Berke
ley puts it, "We may, therefore, reasonably conclude that
if such there be fthat is, abstract ideasJ they are alto
gether confin’d to the learned,”

But this is hardly to be

urged against Locke since his very characterization of ab
stract ideas would make the opinion of the generality of
men irrelevant#

Surely if abstract ideas are very diffi

cult and require study, then the claim that the common man
does not have them, does not constitute any objection to
their existence#

On the other hand, against those who do

not accept Locke’s version of abstract ideas as being so
difficult to frame, Berkeley’s claim remains an unsupported
assumption.
15

In this argument Berkeley seems to be trying,

!
”First Draft of the Introd.”, II, 125*

‘

16
Locke, An Essay gone. Hum# Und., Bk. IT., Oh. 7,
sec. 9* (Vol II, p. 274}* wl’Kus particular ideas are first
received and distinguished and so knowledge got about them;
and next to them the less general or less specific, which
are next to particular* for, abstract ideas are not so
obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind, as
particular ones# If they seem so to grown men, It is only
because by constant and familiar use they are made sot for
when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general
ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry
difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves
as we are apt to imagine.”
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as the old cliche puts it, **to eat his cake and have it too".
The appeal to having established definitely and con
clusively that there are no abstract ideas will follow
through the remainder of Berkeley’s philosophy.

Although

he uses his teaching to prove virtually everything in his
thought, yet we could not 3ay that his philosophy stands or
falls with the success or failure of his endeavour to sub
stantiate this doctrine.

For Berkeley is not merely a man

of one argument.

While the rejection of abstract ideas is the most
basic position in Berkeley’s thought, the esse est percipi
is the statement for which the M 3hop of Oloyne is best
known. MFor as to what is said of the absolute existence of
unthinking things without any relation to their being per
ceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible.

Their esse is

percipi. nor is it possible they should have any existence
out of the minds of thinking things which perceive them.”1^
Hence we have an account of his most distinctive doctrine.
The existence of sensible things consists in their
being perceived, or, in other words, when speaking of sen
sible things to exist and to be perceived are synonymous.
An absolute existence apart from being perceived is flatly
denied.
~

---------------

Yet it is wan opinion strangely prevailing amongst
37 ------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Frinc.» part I, par. 3, (II, 42).
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10

men*, as Bericeley himself admits, that things do have a
real existence outside the mind or distinct from being per
ceived.

The root of this opinion is abstract ideas, which
18
were fostered by the schoolmen.
Bit nothing could be
more abstract, Berkeley informs us, than to consider the
existence of sensible things apart from their being per
ceived.

It is impossible to conceive a sensible thing dis

tinct from our sensation or perception of it.

The two can

not exist apart and hence we cannot abstract one from the
other.

Clearly the force of Berkeley*s argument here de

pends on the rejection of abstract ideas, the proof of which
we have already shown to be doubtful*

■jo

----- 15--------------------------------------------------------------P.O. par. 725, (I, 8 8 ). *H.B. That not common
usage but the Schools coined the Word existence supposed to
stand for an abstract general Idea,*

—

19
Other authors have pointed out Berkeley’s failure
to distinguish the act of sensation frora its object as an
objection to the ease est percipi principle. Tide J. J . laky,
p. 121; Wamoek, p. i; 4W~£~T7 Ayer, The Pound'ations of
Empirical Knowledge. (London, MacMillan and So. ltd*,~T947),
p. o4i.Ayer, although he agrees ultimately with Berkeley,
states the objection clearly. "However the philosophers
who maintain this distinction between act and objeet in their
analysis of sensation do not, for the most part, desire
merely to call attention to an empirical matter of fact, They
consider the distinction to be philosophically important
because they think they can use it to refute Berkeleyan
idealism, Wor, according to Berkeley, colour and shapes and
sound and all other "sensible qualities* are mind-dependent,
inasmuch as their existence consists in their being perceived,
and since material things are, In his view, nothing but
collections of sensible qualities, he concludes that they too
cannot exist apart from a perceiving mind. But here, it is
argued, he falls into error through failing to distinguish
between the objeet of a sensation and the act. Acts of
sensation, it is said, are indeed mind-dependent; but it
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11

But Berkeley does not depend on this one argument
to support his favourite teaching.

He takes the same epis-

temologieal point de depart as Locke and Descartes before
him, that is, he begins with the knowledge of ideas rather
than things.

20

Yet unlike both Locke and Descartes, Berke-

ley does not try to get out of his mind.

21

He makes no

reference to this starting point of Locke and Descartes,
which we might call idealist-in-tendency, because he was so
imbued with Cartesianism as to be unaware of any other
does not follow their objects are? for there is no good
ground for supposing that the object of a sensation cannot
exist apart from the act.*
20
J . Collins, A History of Modem European Philos
ophy (Bruce, Milwaukee, 1959)»p. 3SB, points out that
Berkeley accepts what he calls the *mentalist starting point
of Descartes and Locke.*
21
Locke, An Essay Cone. Hum. Und., Bk. IT, Ch. 1,
sec. 1 , (II, 167). *Since the mind, in'all its thoughts and
reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own ideas,
which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that
our knowledge is only conversant about them*. Yet Locke
does speak of "external sensible objects* which do not exist
only in the mind. Logically such objects will have to be
unknowable and Berkeley wished to avoid this position.
Descartes In his Hedit.ationea de Prima Philosophia. Oeuvres
de Descartes, edited by 'C. Adam an<S P. Tannery (laris, Cerf,
w r a x o j , notably in Meditatio III, (Vol. VII, p. 34-52)
says that he is a thinking thing and then he proceeds from
the ideas he has in his mind to prove the existence of God.
Then in Meditatio VI, (Vol. VII, p. 71—39) he goes on to
prove the existence of the external world. We should note
that he looks at his ideas while still in doubt of the ex
istence of any extramental reality. On Berkeley's remaining
within his own mind Vide Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical
Experience. (Hew York", Charles Scribner'1s Sons, 1937), p.l96f.
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12

possible point of departure.

But he is more vigorously

logical in deriving conclusions from this beginning than
were his predecessors.

If, originally, we know only our

own sensations or ideas, then the so-called external objects
would be unknowable; we are involved in skepticism*

W© are

limiting our knowledge to appearances and positing an unknow
able something beyond them.

Kant admitted the inaccessibili

ty of the thing-in-itself, but developed Locke in a direction
which avoided complete skepticism by postulating subjective
categories in the mind.

Hence what we know are phenomena, a

tertium quid, with the matter supplied by the thing and the
form by our own understanding.
Such a constructive knowledge, however, would not be
satisfactory to Berkeley.

He desires something more In line

with common sense, more realistic.

He brings Locke to a log

ical conclusion in another direction, which also overcomes
the skepticism which Locke had avoided only at the expense
of being Inconsistent, of failing to carry his principles
through to their radical ending,

fhere is, for Berkeley, no

unknowable something; things and ideas are equated.

When we

know our sensations or ideas, we know sensible things, not
just their appearances; we know them as they are in them
selves.
Hence in the Philosophical Commentaries he writes,
*According to my doctrine all things are entia rationis i.e.
solum habent esse in Intellectu.’* And in the next paragraph,
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13
“According to ay doctrine all are not entia rationis.

The

distinction between ens rLonis fsicJ and ens reale is kept
up by it as well as any other Doctrine.*2? At first sight
there appears to be a direct contradiction and possibly that
is the correct interpretation of these passages.

Perhaps

Berkeley is correcting the first passage and deliberately
contradicting it in the second entry.

However it may be mere

ly a carelessness in terminology and possibly we can harmonize
the two quotations.
Sensible things do exist only in the mind— on this
point Berkeley is most emphatic.

But that existence is a real

existence and can be distinguished from the purely mental ex
istence of things which cannot exist* Such things are con23
tradictory
and although we can speak of them, they can have
no existence— the prime example, for Berkeley, being abstract
ideas,

The entia rationis could also refer to things which

are objects of our imagination but not sensible things.
does seem

quite

It

possible then thatthe entia rationis is the

P.O., par. 474» 474a (I, 59). The two quotations
above constitute two complete successive entries which are not
connected with the paragraphs immediately preceding or follow
ing them*
23
J. P. de 0. Day, “George Berkeley 1685-1753“, The
Review of Metaphysics* VI, (1952-1953), p. 267, remarks that
Berkeley confuses logical impossibility with psychological
impossibility, that is, what is inconceivable with what is
unimaginable. Such criticism seems to be sound, the confusion
being a result of the failure to distinguish adequately between
the intellect and the imagination. Of. Semantics and Necessary
Truths An Inquiry into the Foundation of An'alytTcai Philosophy,
(New Haven, Tale [IniversIty Press, 195^7, p. 81
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second passage (P.O. par. 474a) refers to one of these pos
sibilities or perhaps to both.

But if Berkeley is to be

entirely consistent he would not even call the contra
dictions such as abstract ideas, entia rationis for he de
nied not only real but also ideal existence to them.
In a rather involved debate in the Three Dialogues
24
Between Bylas and Philonous.
Berkeley argues against the
independent existence of sensible thing3 . The argument is
based on the definition of sensible things being those im
mediately perceived by sense.

Such a definition could, as

'
:
Mai., II, 174-189. Warnoek describes the two argu
ments in this portion of the first dialogue very clearly; ”He
uses arguments of two different kinds. In some cases he tries
to show by direct argument that some of .-hat we call ’sensible
qualities’ actually are sensations; in others, he uses the
’argument from illusion* in an attempt to show that certain
qualities are hot *in* objects and so (he assumes) must be
*in the mind*. ... The first group of arguments relies on the
point that many qualities of things are often said to be
♦pleasant* or *disagreeable *, sometimes even ’painful*. We
say that a fire is pleasantly warm; that if one gets too close
it feels painfully hot; that vinegar is disagreeably bitter.
Berkeley quite wrongfully proceeds to identify the pleasant of
painful heat of a fire with the pleasant or painful feelings
that people have in its proximity, the bitterness of' vinegar
with the disagreeable sensations of one who tastes it; and he
concludes that these ’sensible qualities* are ’sensations’.
But this Is obviously a confusion. The fire's ’quality* of
being pleasantly warm is not a sensation, but rather what a
fire is said to have which does, or would, occasion pleasant
feelings of warmth in normally sensitive people who do not
get too close to it. The second, group of arguments trades
on the fact that objects sometimes seem different to different
observers in different conditions... He asserts in the course
of his arguments that if some property were ’really Inherent*
in an object, the object would necessarily appear to have that
property in all circumstances... unless this fantastic assumpt
ion is made, the ’argument from illusion* cannot get started.”
pp. 151-153.
23
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is evident, be taken in a realist manner. But for Berkeley
it means that the reality of the sensible thing consists in
its being perceived.

This enables Berkeley to make the

seemingly realist statement that we know things— but "things*
are ideas,

Once this starting point, that is, the definition

of sensible things as the Bishop of Cloyne understands it, is
accepted, the distinction between thing and idea is impossible
to maintain.
We must note, however, that the starting point itself
is given an arbitrary interpretation which tends toward ide
alism.

The radical position, that is, the esse est percipi.

which is necessary to avoid skepticism, would be enough to
render one suspicious of this interpretation of the defini
tion of sensible things. What Berkeley really assumes is
that we know our sensations rather than things; he does not
actually prove this.

Or perhaps we should say that he offers

a sophistical argument, namely, that to say that we know
2*5

things is to say that things are in our mind. ^

But the

things in our mind are ideas and it is, therefore, these ideas
which we know.

One could object that ideas are not what we

know but rather the means by which we know things.2^

Berkeley

------- 25--------------------------- 1------------------Brine., Part I, par. 6 , (II, 43).
26
Laky, p. 121, observes Berkeley’s failure to make
this distinction. "For him ideas are the id quod and not the
id quo, thus confusing the how of knowing wTth the what of
Knowing.*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16

is not actually very concerned with proving this point which
he probably did not expect to be questioned, embedded firmly
as he was in the Cartesian tradition

of his time.

When Berkeley appeals to the reader to consider in
his own mind, **the absolute existence of sensible objects in
27
themselves or without the mind.H
and see if it is not a
direct contradiction, his case once again rests on a Cartesian
foundation.

It is so manifestly a contradiction to himself

that he feels any fair-minded reader calmly considering this
abstract idea cannot fail to agree with him.

The truth of

the esse est percipi is so obvious to Berkeley that he scarce28
ly takes any pains to prove it.
For two reasons he prefers the term Hidea” to

thing”,

even though both are used synonymously. First, the term
thing” is more comprehensive and could refer to spirits or
thinking things as well as to ideas, the latter being only
identical with sensible things, ”Idea”, then, should have a
precise technical meaning in Berkeley, although unfortunately
he does not remain faithful to this signification at all
B r i n e ,. P a r t I, par, 24,

(II,

51).

28
Warnock, p, 145, is struck by Berkeley’s certitude
on this issue, ”Tdeas, he repeatedly insists,exist ’only in
the mind *; they exist only when they are actually perceived;
’Their being is to be perceived or known*. This too, at the
very outset of his argument, he declares to be ’evident*,
the contrary ’plainly repugnant’. He seems to think that his
assertion stands in no need of explanation or defense.”
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times.
Closely allied with his esse est peroipi principle
is the rejection of matter or material substance.

In the

Three Dialogues Between Hyias and Philonous. commencing
with sensible things as those immediately perceived by
sense, Berkeley argues, through his spokesman Philonous,
that we only know sensible qualities.

Prom which it follows

that, “sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many
sensible qualities or combinations of sensible qualities.**^0
These sensible qualities, whose existence is to-be-perceived,
exist in the mind*

The material substratum said to underlie

these qualities is not itself perceived immediately, and
31
hence is not sensible. Hylas, the straw man,
who is in
favour of material substance, tries to explain what he means
by substance supporting its accidents, but finds that he is
unable to do so.

In fact, Hylas discovers that even apart

22

.

—

For the most part Berkeley does restrict his use
of the word “idea1* to his own technical meaning. However,he
is a little careless on occasion, e.g. P.O., par. 887,
(I, 104}i Brine.. Part I, par. 140, (II, 105).
30
Dial.. II, 175.
31
Hylas represents a point of view which is basically
Lockean, thus giving Berkeley an excellent opportunity to de
velop his thought against the background of a popular philoso
phy of the day. Moreover because of his empirical idealism,
Locke *s philosophy furnishes an admirable point of departure
for Berkeley. The name Hylas is too similar to the Greek word
for matter, hyie. to be a coincidence. There might also be a
play on the Greek word, hylao, meaning ’bark* or *bayV.
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from not ha-ring a proper idea of matter, since it is not per
ceived by senses, we do not have any understanding of matter.
We have no idea of it, using the term “idea” in a more gener
al sense.

Philonous now charges that the proof should lie

with the one who holds the affirmative side.

Since Hylas can

not support his position, there is no reason to cling to it.
Moreover matter or material substance is an abstract
32
idea and consequently is to be cast off on this ground also.
For the acceptance of matter leads us to posit an unknown
and unknowable something which is really what Locke did.^
But such a position is skeptical and Berkeley wants to avoid
skepticism at all costs,

fo maintain this old idea of the

existence of material substance in view of a point of depar
ture which is idealist-in-tendency is indeed difficult to do.
Berkeley is once again bringing Locke to a logical conclusion,
an extreme one which the moderate Englishman would never

22

-

M. 0. Beardley, “Berkeley on *Abstract Ideas*M,
Mind. Vol. Ill, p* 157, does not think that this argument is
valid. **!he doctrine of abstract Ideas furnishes no real support
to Berkeley’s argument against the existence of material sub
stance independent of perception.** Ihe reason for this opinion
is not made clear in the article.
33
Locke. Essay Gone. Hum. Hnd.. Be. II. ch. 23. sec 4.
(Yol. I, p. 336) , ’HTel because" we cannot conceive how they
£I.e. sensible qualitiesJ should subsist alone, nor one in
another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by, some
common subject; which support we denote by the name ’substance*,
though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that
thing we suppose a support.1*
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accept.
Of course, Berkeley does not feel he is going against
common sense or the ordinary people.

He is only rejecting the

philosophical sense of “material substance*, “which in effect
is no sense."

The ordinary man, who has not "been tainted by

the abstract jargon of the philosophers, only understands by
corporeal substance, "Bulk, Solidity & such like sensible
qualitys £ alaj,*

In other words, Berkeley claims to be in

line with the thinking of the common man with regard to the
meaning of material substance.

The value of his argument here

seems open to question; "material substance* is a technical
philosophic term and it seems to be begging the question merely
to assert that ordinary men regard things only as so many sen
sible qualities.
It is doubtful if they have any opinion at all on such
a topic.

How could an ordinary man who has no philosophical

background even discuss this issue?

His very use of words

will differ from that of philosophers, which if not radically
different, will at least be more refined and precise.

There

fore it seems necessary that we first express the thoughts of
the ordinary man in philosophical language before we can dis
cuss his opinion.

The possibility of doing this is certainly

open to dispute,

34

^

Laky, p. 41, notes that Berkeley overcomes the flaws
in Locke* "With a keener and more logical mind than Locke *s,
he successfully opposed the inconsistencies and contradictions
in Locke*8 system",
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Again within the Cartesian framework, Berkeley takes
up the distinction between primary and secondary qualities
to support his case.

Locke gives the classical expression

for this distinction in his assay Concerning Human Under
standing* ^

Primary qualities are those Hutterly insepa

rable from the body*, that is, in such a manner that they
remain in the body in all changes and in every particle of
matter.

These qualities are extension, solidity, figure,

motion, or rest and number*

Secondary qualities such as

colour, odour, temperature, etc., are themselves nothing in
the objects but powers to produce various sensations in us.
In brief, the primary qualities really exist in bodies, the
secondary do not.
The primary qualities then are said to exist in mat
ter out3ide of the mind, but not the secondary.
exist in matter because of their variability.

They do not
Hence some

thing at a distance may appear different in colour, or under
a microscope or to a person with jaundice it appears differ
ent and so on.

All colours then are only apparent and none

of those we perceive are really inherent in any outward ob
ject.

The same argument is intended to apply, mutatis

m ut a n d i s , w i t h re g a r d to odours,

sounds,

etc.

Thus far Berkeley and Locke are in agreement, but
Berkeley Is not satisfied to stop here.

There is, he claims,

-------------------------------------------------------------

Bfc. II, Ch. 1, secs. 9, 10, 15, (I, 270-278, 296301), This distinction is found in Descartes, Brlneipia
Philosophiae, I, 53? IV, 193-199, (Vol. VIII, p. 25? 32132$). Cf. Berkeley, Dial.. II, 187f.
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no real "basis for the distinction between primary and sec
ondary qualities.
primary qualities.

Berkeley uses the same argument against
Thus the extension of a thing appears

different at various distances or to take a more extreme
example, the extension of a sensible thing would appear
niusri greater to a mite than to a man.

rtThere is no exten

sion or figure in our object because to one eye it shall
seem little, smooth and round, when at the same time it
appears to the other eye, great uneven and angular.**
This whole line of argumentation may, at first
sight, appear weak and even frivolous, but we must try to
put ourselves into the whole atmosphere of thought in which
Berkeley is immersed.

Once you admit sensible qualities are

those immediately perceived by sense, according to Berkeley*s
interpretation of this phrase, then the force of the argument
becomes apparent.

The application to primary qualities no

less than to secondary qualities is equally manifest,
Locke described the primary qualities as those with
out which we cannot conceive an object.

But even this is an

abstraction since we cannot, in Berkeley*s terns, think of
an extended thing which is of no colour, shape, etc.

In

other words the thing with only its primary qualities is

still an abstract idea, and idea which we cannot form.
Dial., II, 189.
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As has “
been seen, Berkeley’s establishment of this tenet
against Locke’s doctrine is unanswerable.
But the greatest objection to positing the actual
existence of primary qualities in the materialsubstance is
that such a position entails the acceptance of

the absolute

existence of sensible things, ”And is not this a direct
37
repugnancy and altogether inconceivable?”
Even if it were
possible for material substance to exist without the mind,
it would be unknowable.

By our senses we only know what we

perceive and we clearly do not perceive any material
substratum. Furthermore, we need not suppose the existence
of matter to explain how our ideas are caused. In fact, the
’’materialist” cannot explainhow body can act upon spirit
38
and produce ideas.
If matter did exist, then Sod would
have created innumerable beings for no reason at all. Locke’s
description of the world, in Berkeley’s opinion would involve
■■■-.
J. A. Brunton, ”Berkeley and the External World”,
Philosophy 28 (October 1957) p. 325-341, is convinced that
the absolute existence of non-thinking things is a contra
diction. But he says further that he cannot prove this to
anyone who does not see it as a contradiction. A, A, Luce,
p. 22 who is a convinced ”immaterialist”, defends Berkeley
and points out that ”he so denied matter as to affirm the
sensible”. Pap, p. 162m writes: ”Berkeley only denied a
philosophical theory with regard to the nature of material
objects not that there are material objects.”
" "

—

---

38
The problem of the interaction of mind and body
was introduced by the dualism of Descartes, He had recourse
to the rather facile explanation that the pineal gland was
the point of interaction. His successors, Kalebranehe,
Spinoza and Leibniz all struggled with this problem.
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needless duplication*

In any case we could never know its

existence, even if it did exist.
All of Berkeley’s arguments involve either the re
jection of abstract ideas or the esse est peroipi« or both,
nevertheless within his own frame of reference and partic
ularly taking up the positions of Locke and thinking them
through to their logical though bizarre conclusions, Berke
ley does argue cogently.

Locke's only possible appeal would

be to common sense but such an objection is surely not philo
sophical, nor could Locke's own thought be aptly called a
philosophy of common sense.
In spite of his Idealism, Berkeley does still claim
to be a realist. 39 "The question between the materialists
and me is not, whether things have a real existence out of
the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an
absolute existence, distinct from being perceived by God and
exterior to all minds.

Sensible things really exist

apart from my perceiving them, but still their esse is
percipl; the idealism remains, only very slightly obfuscated.
Hence Berkeley can make what appears at first sight to be a
straightforward realist statement, e.g., HI question not the
--------Claude Arnold in an unpublished dissertation The
lotion of Substance in Bishop Berkeley (The University of
^estern'lIn'iarloV T35T7 p.' 44, makes the observation that
Berkeley's doctrine is analogous to Aristotelian realism
because of the Identification of "ideas" and "real things",
40
Mai., II, 235.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24
existence of anything that we perceive by the senses.1*^1
But since existence is defined as being perceived, any such
statements about the real world cannot lose their essential
ly idealist east.
Because Berkeley said that things are independent of
all finite perceivers and exist in the Divine Mind, he was
accused of holding that we see all things in God.

He objects

to this arraignment and specifically mentions that he is dis
pleased at being ranked with Malebranche on this point.^
Malebranche holds for an absolute external world, but one
which is knowable only by revelation.

Our senses for him are
not reliable and cannot assure us of its existence. 43 Berkeley,
------- 41------------------- ----------------------------Letter 12, (VIII, 37). Vide etiaia P.O., par. 312,
(I, 38); Brine., paid; I, par. 33, (Tl, $4).
42
Letter^l4, (VIII, 41). J. B, Jessop, "Malebranche
and Berkeley", Revue Internationale de Philosophie I (19381939), p. 138f., agrees with Berkeley1^ protestations on this
point "When system is compared with system, both contents and
principles are deeply different. Berkeley was certainly right
in repudiating any genuine similarity between his doctrine and
Malebranche1s*. On the specific issue of sense he writes "Bor
Berkeley the veracity of sense is as fundamental as its inve
racity for Malebranche". But A. D. Fritz, "Malebranche and the
Immaterialisa of Berkeley*, fhe Review of Metaphysics III (1949))
pp. 59-80, believes that Berkeley is botS’metaphysically and
episteaologieally dependent on Malebranche.
43
Nicole Malebranche, Bntretiens sur la Metaphysique et
sur la Religion, edition critique de ArmandOuvilier. u. Vrln.
H F i s T i P T T W , v, (II, I87f,) "II n ’ya done point d *autre
vole que la revelation qui puisse nous assurer, que Dieu a bien
voulu creer des corps; suppose' neanmoins ce dont vous ne doutez
plus, spavoir qu*ils ne sont point visibles par eux-mernes,
qu’ils ne peuvent agir dans notre esprit, ni se representer a
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on the other hand, taking a more reasonable stand, knows of
the existence of the sensible v/orld and the nature of sensi
ble tilings through his perception of this world.

It is true

that God constantly affects hims with all the sensible impres
sions he perceives since sensible things themselves are purely
passive and cannot affect him. But this is not to say that we
44
see all things in the Divine Hind, as Malebranche holds.
Berkeley finds this doctrine incomprehensible.
We have treated three key ideas in the philosophy of
George Berkeley, namely, the rejection of abstract ideas, the
esse est percipl. and the rejection of material substance.
These constitute the backdrop for the main attraction, the
realm of the spirit, God and finite minds.

The understanding

of these three basic doctrines is presupposed in the discus
sion of spiritual substance.

lui j et que notre esprit lui-meme ne peut les oonno£tre que
dans les idees qui les representent, ni les sentir que par
des modalitez ou des sentiments, dont ils ne peuvent etre la
cause,

q u 'en c o n s e q u e n c e des loi x ar b i t r a l r e s de 1 ’u n i o n de

1 *ame et du corps.H
44
Ibid., VTII, xii, (II, 250f,); Malebranche*s own
aption t o Bniretien II reads MHous pouvons voir en lui
DieuJ toutes choses...n (I, 85).

T
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THB EXISTENCE OF SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES
When Berkeley speaks of spiritual substance, soul,
mind, or spirit, all of which words he uses synonymously,^
he introduces a new technical term, "notion*.

Actually

the term does not appear until the second edition of the
Principles of Human Knowledge, as is pointed out In the
2
editor's Introduction to this work, but only the word it
self Is new, not that for which It stands.
As we saw, ideas are equated with sensible things,
that is, with the things that we perceive with our senses.
We do not perceive spiritual substance, neither our own,
nor those of other men, nor do we perceive God, and hence
the technical term "Idea* cannot be properly used in refer
ence to our knowledge of spirits,

Berkeley does at times

say we have an idea of spirit but only in the sense that we
know it.
fhe tern •'notion" is used to designate our knowledge
of spirits "In a large sense indeed we may be said to have
an

idea or rather a notion of spirit, that is, we

understand

the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or
1
Prine., Part 1, par. 2, (II, 41f.)

~

2

Vol. II, p. 13.
26
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3
deny any thing of it.*1

He desires a different word to indi-

cate our knowledge of a radically different entity,

Possibly

he does not develop his notion of *notionH because it is only
a word, and he is professedly disinterested in mere verbal
issues.

We have knowledge of spiritual substancej the tech

nical tern MideaH cannot be applied to this knowledge, but
what It is called is of no great concern.
way Berkeley would look at the issue.

Perhaps this is the

It may well be, however,

that he was unable to give an adequate explanation of *notionn,
and that this is the true reason for his brevity and vagueness
4
with regard to this word.
We might wonder if the notion we have of spiritual sub
stance is not actually an abstract idea,

The fact that we can

*affirm or deny any thing of it,* does not prove we have any
understanding of it, for we can do this even with material sub
stance,

Is Berkeley’s treatment of wnotionw condemned to b©

vague and nebulous because ho wants to posit knowledge of an
entity which, v/ithin his own philosophical world, should remain
unknowable?

We shall try to keep this question in mind as we

consider more fully Berkeley *s treatment of spiritual substance.
5
^
^
Prlnc. Part 1, par. 140, (II, 105).

^

4
Warnock, p. 205, thinks that Berkeley’s explanation
of notion was quite unsatisfactory. Likewise U, Baladi, La
pensee religieuae de Berkeley et 1*unite de sa philosophie.
XS'arls, Vrin, 1§45T~P. iol' *Par notion, iT^ne faut entrend re
autre chose qu’une certain© connaissance— Bn principe, tout
ee dont nous avons une notion, nous la connaissons.”
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Y/hile it appears that Berkeley does not have any pre
decessor in the use of •‘notion* as a technical term, at least
in the meaning which he gives it, yet a certain similarity
with the “intuition* of Descartes can he detected.

For

Descartes, an intuition was a clear and distinct knowledge hy
which we could see with certitude such things as our own ex
istence, that a triangle has three sides, that the glohe has a
single surface and so on,^

She parallel is not exact for the

intuition of Descartes is not restricted to the knowledge of
spirits hut the manner of knowing hears a marked resemblance*
The “inner feeling* of Malebranche is likewise similar to
Berkeley*s “notion*, although Berkeley knows only himself by an
immediate non-demonstrative type of knowledge, whereas Male
branche also knows God in this way.
It seems then that “intuition* and “inner feeling*
would be satisfactory descriptions of our knowledge of self as
a spirit as Berkeley explains it.

However, “notion* applies

not only to our knowledge of self, but also to our knowledge
of other spirits and of God.

Here, as we shall see, the manner

of our knowledge is not the same as in our knowledge of self.
In this way Berkeley’s term “notion* has a wider scope than
either the “intuition* of Descartes or the “inner feeling* of
Malebranche.
In the Principles of Human knowledge. Berkeley tries
to prove the existence of an incorporeal active substance or
—
■
—
—
Descartes, Regulae ad Dlrectlonera Ingenli. Reg. Ill,
(Vol. X, p. 368).
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spirit.**

We perceive a continual succession of ideas which

must depend on some cause to produce them.

This cause can

not be any quality, or idea, or combination of ideas. Clearly
an ideam which is purely passive, cannot cause anything. Just
look at the ideas in your mind and you will find in them no
power or activity.

Their being is to be perceived; they are

essentially, indeed entirely, passive.

Hence an idea or a

combination of them cannot be the cause of the successive
ideas we perceive.
The cause of our ideas must therefore be a substance.
But it has been established already that there is no corpo
real active substance.

Consequently there must be an incor

poreal active substance which is the cause of our ideas.
Such is Berkeley’s general argument for the exist
ence of spiritual substance.

In terms of his own philosophy

he has argued cogently against ideas as causes.

But the pure

passivity of ideas or sensible things is gratuitous and rests
on the esse eat percipi principle which Berkeley has failed
to establish conclusively.

Moreover such a position is hard

ly in line with common sense or the generality of men— al
though in itself this is only an indication, not a proof, of
its falsity.

If we acknowledge his definition of idea, then

of course the argument is very solid.
However the claim that the cause of our ideas must be
a substance, involves a jump which requires further considerg--------------------------------------------------------------

Brine.. Part I, par. 26, (II, 52).
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atlon.

It seems to imply that things are either ideas or

substances and that this is a complete disjunction.

But to

presuppose these two categories as exhaustive would be
begging the question.

Berkeley is, in effect, assuming the

existence of that which he professes to prove.
Moreover the very term substance may be an abstract
idea since we do not perceive substances.

We perceive sen-

7
sible things, and, as Hume asserts,'the
same difficulties
with regard to material substance also apply to spiritual
substance along with additional ones peculiar to it.

But

Hume *s arguments prove that we cannot have an idea of spirit
since to have an idea we must have a sensation.

As we have

seen, Berkeley does not claim that v/e have an idea of spirit,
so that Hume’s criticism is not entirely germane, and does
not prove we do not know spiritual substance.
Both Hume and Berkeley accept the Lockean position
that we know our own sensations, and their disagreement seems
to revolve on the Issue of whether we can argue back from our
sensations to a spiritual substance presupposed by the existtf

;

Bavid Hume, A treatise on Human, ifature, (Oxford,
Glaredon, 1889) editetf \sj 1." A'.' ^elby-Bl'ggelie. I, part IT,
sec. 5, (p. 232f,}. ”$his question [the meaning of substance]
we have found Impossible to be answer’d with regard to matter
and body: But besides that in the case of the .mind, it la
bours under all the same difficulties, ’tis burthen*d with
some additional ones, which are peculiar to that subject. As
every idea is deriv’d from a precedent impression, had we
any idea of the substance of our minds, we must also have an
Impression of it; which is very difficult, if not impossible,
to be conceived. For how can an impression represent a sub
stance, otherwise than by resembling It? And how can an im
pression resemble a substance, since, according to this phi
losophy, it is not a substance, and has none of the peculiar
qualities or characteristics of a substance?”
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enee of these sensations,

Hume denies the efficacy of rea

son to do s o f o r this would involve a causal argument end
ing with the existence of spiritual substance,

Berkeley has

merely assumed the causal principle which Hume attacked and
in no way has foreseen the objections Hume presented. Al
though Berkeley is more confident in the power of reason, he
has not sought to justify this confidence.
In treating spiritual substance, Berkeley divides
his consideration into three parts: self, other finite spirits,
and God,

The existence of each of these three is not known in

the same way,

Ve have looked at Berkeley*s general argument

which does not distinguish between God and finite spirits (al
though strictly speaking Berkeley should have presented it
only as an argument for the existence of Goc$«
treat each separately.

But let us now

How do we know, first of all, of our

own existence as a spiritual being?
**We comprehend our own being by inward feeling or re9

flection.*

And a clearer statement, **I do nevertheless know

that I who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as cer
tainly as I know my ideas exist,

Farther I know what I mean

by the terms I and myself; and I know this immediately and in
tuitively, though I do not perceive it, as I perceive a triangle,
§
Ibid. Sk. I, Part III, sec. 6, (p. 86) "*Tis there
fore by SfflililSHGB only, that we can infer the existence of
one object from that of another.** Tide etiam sec, 2-5 for
Hume*s views on causality.
9
Princ., Part L, par. 89, (II, 80),
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a colour or a sound.

Berkeley knows himself intuitively

to he a spiritual substance; he appears to have no hesi
tation or difficulty on this point.

But we can easily ob

ject that we do not have such an intuition.

Did not Berke

ley himself make a similar objection with regard to abstract
ideas?

Berkeley does not seem to have any other refuge than

to reaffirm his position, since he has made an assertion for
which he has no arguments.
We perceive a succession of ideas.

But how do we

know that our inward being is any more than this succession?
If all our knowledge begins with our senses, how is this in
tuition of self as a spiritual being to be explained?

It

does not seem consonant with Berkeley*s epistemology.

He

also mentions reflection as a means of knowing self as a spir
itual substance, but no specific argument is developed to sup
port this contention.

The general argument we have consid

ered above does not apply because it would mean that we are
the cause of our own ideas.

But as we shall see when we treat

of God*s existence, Berkeley rejects self as an adequate expla
nation of the continual succession of ideas which we perceive.
In view then of his theory of knowledge, it appears that Berke
ley has no justification for saying that self is any more than
a flux of perceptions.

To posit self as a spiritual substance

--------- is--------------------------------------------------------------

Mai. II, 231.
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is gratuitous.
In proving the existence of God, Berkeley argues
from the mind-dependent nature of sensible things, MSensible
things do really exists and if they really exist, they are
necessarily perceived by an infinite minds therefore there
is an infinite mind or God.

This furnishes you with a direct

and immediate demonstration from a most evident principle; of
the being of God.**-^

Berkeley's argument clearly hangs on the

validity of the esse est pcrcipi principle. Unless the exist
ence of sensible things consists in being perceived, the proof
collapses.

It is to be noted that the proof as presented here

is rather elliptical.

The necessity of sensible things being

perceived by an infinite mind is not evident because Berkeley
has omitted the step which would refer to the inadequacy of
appealing to the perception of finite percelvers to account
for the existence of sensible things.
-------— -------- -— ■
n —
■
— ■
—
■
—
— ---- * —
0. H, Morris, Locke. Berkeley. Hume. (London, Oxford
University Press, 1946), p. 100, also points" out that Berkeley
gives no adequate justification of the immediate knowledge he
claims the mind has of itself. Laky, p. S3 writes: "It must
immediately be pointed out that he fails to give a rational
explanation of his knowledge of, and belief in, the existence
of his own mind, as a spiritual substance**. The objection of
Laky that if spiritual substance has no percipi, it has no esse
or reality seems unsatisfactory since Berkeley refers the esse
est percipi only to sensible things. Luce p. 146-148, defends
Serkeley's intuitive knowledge of self but merely gives Berke
ley's own view without answering any objections, or offering
any new arguments to support this position.
12
Mai., II, 212.
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Although Berkeley uses the esse est percipi to
prove the existence of Sod, he conversely requires the
existence of God to maintain the reality of sensible things.
In terms of his thought if God were not perceiving things
then they would only exist when some finite perceiver is
actually perceiving them*
no "external* world,

In the latter case there would he

13 no sensible things which are independ

ent of the mind even in the sense which Berkeley allows.
There is then a circularity in Berkeley's argument since he
has proven the existence of God from the reality of sensible
things whose existence consists in being perceived.

Tet he

also needs the existence of God before he can assert the
1A
reality of sensible things.
Berkeley presents another argument for the existence
of God.

Beginning with the succession of ideas we have, he

argues to God as their cause.

These ideas which we have are

vivid, orderly, coherent and are not caused by ourselves. They
are external to us, and not subject to our control;
----------------- j j ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Vide infra, p. 35 for Berkeley's meaning of "exter
nal*,.
14
J. Collins, p. 393, notes this circularity "The cap
ital distinction between what is strictly perceivable and what
is only Imaginable by us, is secured only by measuring the
humanly perceivable by the implicit standard of what God actu
ally perceives. But this means that the Hew Principle itself’
esse est percipi , both serves as the basis for the proof of
God *s existence and stands in need of His existence for its
own foundation,"
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The things perceived by sense may be termed external, with
regard to their origin, in that they are not generated from
within, by the mind itself, but imprinted by a spirit dis
tinct from that which perceives them* Sensible objects may
likewise be said to be without the mind, in another sense,
namely when they exist in some other mind. Thus when I shut
my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in
another mind. 5
Berkeley, the friend of common sense, does not claim to con
trol the idea of sense which he has in his mind.

They are

independent of his mind and hence require some active being
as their efficient cause.

The sensible things themselves can

not be the cause since they are purely passive.

Only an infi

nite mind or God have caused this marvellous harmony of ideas
which we experience.
This argument is basically the same as the previous
one.

In the former, we begin with sensible things, in the

latter with the ideas in the mind, but both are identical.
Likewise the esse est percipi principle Is invoked in each
argument,

finally God is the cause who accounts for the real

ity of sensible things or the vividness and order of the ideas.
We might also note that God is the immediate cause of
all things. *One idea not the cause of another, one power not
the cause of another.

The cause of all natural things is
•j

only God.

Hence trifling to enquire after second Causes.#

Because he holds for the pure passivity of sensible things,
Berkeley is forced to take this radical position.
--------- 15----------------------------------------------------------

Princ.. Part I, par. 90, (II, 80).
16
P. 0., par. 443, (I, 54).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

c

36

Descartes had argued to the existence of sensible
things or the corporeal word on the basis that a position
such as that which Berkeley has embraced would make God a
deceiver* 17 We have the impression, Descartes argues, that
sensible things are causes e.g.fire causes pain.

We have

no means of knowing that this pain is caused directly by
God rather than by the fire itself and in fact are inclined
to believe it is the fire which is the cause.
Although Berkeley does not give an explicit answer
to Descartes on this point, it is easy to provide the answer
he might have made,

Descartes is deceived when he thinks

that corporeal objects act on us, or are in any way causes,
but the deception is not the fault of God.

What Descartes

has failed to realize is the pure passivity of ideas. Once
we recognize the true nature of ideas, then it is evident
that God caused all things, andhence the delusion to which
we are inclined can be avoided.
Mfhe connexion of ideas does not imply the relation
of cause and effect but only of a mark or sign with the
thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of
--------- IT---------------------------------------------------------

Descartes, Mediattones de prima philosophla.
Meditation VI, (Vol. Vtll, p T y§f) , "Cum Deus" non sl't' fallax,

oranino manifestum est ilium nec per se iimediate istas ideas
mihi imnittere, nec etiaza mediants aliqua ereatura, in qua
earum realitas objectiva, non formal!ter, sed eminenter
tanturn contineatur. Cum enim nullam plane faeultatem mihi
dederit ad hoc agnoseendura, sed contra magnam propensionum
ad credendum illas a rebus corporeis eraitti, non video qua
ratione posset intellegi ipsum non esse fallacem, si aliunde
quara a rebus corporeis emitterentur. Ac proinde res corporeae
existunt

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37
the pain I suffer upon my approaching it but the mark that
T8
forewarns me of it.*
But if there is no causal relationship among sensible things or ideas then it seems we could
not come to know causality.

Hot by an idea for it is not

a sensible thing ana not by a notion unless some intuition
of it is to be claimed. Moreover, in the Philosophical
Commentaries, Berkeley writes, "Fihil dat quod non habet or
the effect is contained in the cause is an axiom I do not
understand or believe to be true.*-*-9 Here he takes the posi
tion with regard to causality which is more in harmony with
ids thought.

Yet his argument for the existence of Cod in

volves causality.

It proceeds on the assumption that the

sensible things we perceive must have a cause.

However to

reject secondary causality seems to involve the rejection of,
or at least a skeptical position with regard to, all causal
ity.

It seems to lead to a doctrine like Hume’s.
m

---------------------

Brine., Bart I, par. 65, (II, 69). A. J. Ayer,
p. 225t shows the influence of Berkeley on his own understand
ing of cause. “How it is quite? time that what Berkeley meant
by “power or activity* is not anywhere to be detected in the
objects that we perceive; but the inference I draw from this
is not that such objects cannot have causal properties, but
rather the term “cause* must, in the context, be divorced from
the animistic notions of power and activity if it is to have
any significant application and indeed, in the sense in which
I am interpreting “causality", Berkeley himself areed that
"ideas* could cause one another for he regarded the "laws of
nature* as de facto correlations of "ideas*, A. A. Luce, p.91,
gives a helpTul summary of Berkeley’s view on causality.
19
P. C., par. 780, (I, 94).
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At first sight Berkeley’s proof for the existence of
God looks more like those of St, Thomas Aquinas than like
the ontological proof of Descartes.

Bar Berkeley proceeds

from sensible things rather than from the idea of God in the
mind.

But since these sensible things do not have an abso

lute “external® existence in as much as their esse is percipi.
Berkeley is beginning like Descartes, and unlike Aquinas, in
20

the mind.

The order is similar to that of Descartes,

commencing with the thinking thing and its ideas and proceed
ing to God, although Berkeley does not go on to prove the
existence of the extramental world.
Berkeley argues from ideas to God as their cause. But
the ideas are the real things, that is, the real and the ideal
are identical and the argument should end with God as an idea.
However Berkeley does not accept this conclusion.

He desires

to go beyond the limits which his own thought allows.

Thus

he attempts to give a cosmological argument but starting as
he does from within his own mind, such an essay is doomed to
fail.
~
Descartes, Meditationes. In Hed. Ill, (Vol. VII,
p. 34-52) the existence of Soil is proved" by considering the
idea of God, as eternal, infinite, all powerful etc* and
arguing from this idea to God as the cause of this idea. In
Med. V* (Vol. VII, p. 63—71) he argues from the impossibility
ofconceiving God except as existing to the fact that he exists.
In both cases Descartes begins in the mind with an idea and in
fact, both arguments are basically the same. Only after esta
blishing God’s existence does he attempt to prove the exist
ence of the world in Med. VI, (Vol. VII, p. 71-80).
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How does Berkeley deal with other spirits besides
ourselves and

Grad?

Jirst, we might point out that he makes

no explicit mention of angels, although much of his treat
ment of finite spirits could apply equally well to angels
and men.

Moreover we should remember that in the Cartesian

tradition, the distinction between men and angels narrows;
their mode of knowledge particularly is more alike than in
Thomistic thought.
We cannot know the existence of other spirits,
otherwise than by their operations or the ideas of them
excited in us, I perceive notions, changes, and combina
tions of ideas, that infora me there are certain particu
lar agents like my self, which accompany them, and concur
in their production. Hence the knowledge I have of other
spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas;
but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred
to agents or spirits distinct from rayself, as effects or
concomitant signs
This argument clearly presupposes the questionable state
ments which Berkeley used to establish •’myself* as a spirit
ual substance. Moreover he appeals to a causal principle
when he uses the words ”effects or concomitant signs’*.

He

appears to use ’’effects” and Mcone omit ant signs” synonymous
ly in the quotation, but clearly the words have different
meanings.
do not.

”Effects” imply causality; ”concomitant signs”
If intermediary ideas are effects then spirits can

--------- 51------------------------------ — ------------ --------------

Brine., Bart I, par, 145* (II* 107), Berkeley
does not give any examples of the ideas excited in us by
which we come to know the existence of other spirits.
Probably he means the talking, walking, eating, etc,, which
we observe other men doing.
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be argued to as their cause, although we might question
Berkeley*s consistency in doing so*

He would he holding

both that God is the only cause and that there are second
ary spiritual beings, other
causes,

If he means that these ideas are merely concomi

tant signs by which we know
ble?

human minds,which are also

spirits —

how is this

possi

In this case there isno reason to posit the exist

ence of finite spirits at all, sinoe everything can he ex
plained directly by the first cause, God.

Ihe argument for

the existence of other finite spirits does not stand up
under close scrutiny.
Berkeley does admit that, Hwe do not see a man if
by man is meant that which moves, perceives and thinks as
we do; but only such a certain collection of

i d e a s . ”22

How

can we know that man is any more than this combination of
Ideas or sensations which are caused by God and which
really exist only in God?

What further explanation than

this is required by Berkeley’s thought?
In this third dialogue between Hylas and Philonous,
23
Berkeley pursues this issue further.
His spokesman Phil
onous points out that the existence of other finite spirits
------- 55---------- ------------------------------- -----Brine.. Bart I, par. 148, (II, 109).
23
M a i .. II, 233f. J. P. deG. Bay, p. 96f., thinks
that Berkeley anticipates the objection of Huae that we know
ourselves only as a bundle of perceptions and satisfactorily
answers it.
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is know neither by an immediate evidence nor by a demonstra
tive knowledge. Nevertheless such spirits are not to be put
on an equal footing with matter because there is no repugnancy
in a spirit being the subject of ideas.

The exposition ends,

•*1 have a notion of spirit, though X have not strictly speak

ing, an idea of it.

I do not perceive it as an idea or by

means of an idea, but know it by reflexion.”
Berkeley admits that we do not have "immediate evi
dence” of other finite spirits.

This means we do not per

ceive them as we do sensible things or ideas, nor do we have
an intuitive knowledge of them as we do of ourselves as spir
itual beings.

Likewise we are unable to demonstrate the ex

istence of other finite spirits.

Unless Berkeley is not being

entirely consistent, and this is a distinct possibility, he
must mean some particular type of proof by the phrase "demon
strative knowledge”. However, since he does not elucidate
his meaning, it is impossible to ascertain the exact signifi
cation of this phrase.

The knowledge by "reflexion” seeras to

refer to the proof which argues from ideas as effects back to
their cause, in this instance, other finite spirits.
this not mean that we know spirits by means of ideas?

Would
Yet

Berkeley took the contrary opinion in the question above, MI
have not strictly speaking an idea of it fspirit]", Perhaps
he means that even though it is from ideas that we come to
know spirits, the actual knowledge itself is not an idea.
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Thus far in the Dialogue Berkeley has only argued
that the existence of other finite spirits does not involve
a contradiction and he refers to this existence as Ma proba
bility*1, Hylas now objects that there is no need in
Philonous * philosophy to posit any type of substance but Ba
system of floating ideas** will suffice*

Philonous replies

that he himself is a thinking active principle that knows
ideas and he knows what he means when he affirms that spirit
ual substance supports ideas.

This is the whole answer given;

it does not seem entirely germane to the objection*

The

existence of self as a spiritual substance which does not
involve a contradiction has been asserted.

But no satisfac-

24
Dial*. II, 233*. *HYMS. Notwithstanding all you
have said, to me it seems that according to your way of think
ing, and in consequence of your own principles, it should
follow that you are only a system of floating ideas, without
any substance to support them. Words are not to be used with
out a meaning* And as there is no more meaning in spiritual
substance than in material substance, the one is to be ex
ploded as well as the other.
PHILONOUS. How often must I repeat, that I know or am con
scious of my own being; and that I my self am not my ideas,
but somewhat else; a thinking active principle that perceives,
knows, wills; and operates about ideas. I know that I, one and
the same self, perceive both colours and sounds; that a colour
cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour; that 1 am there
fore one individual principle, distinct from colour and sound;
and, for the same reason, from all other sensible things and
inert ideas. But I am not in like manner conscious either of
the existence or essence of matter. On the contrary, I know
that nothing inconsistent can exist; and that the existence
of matter implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know what I
mean, when I affirm there is a spiritual substance or support
of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas.
But I do not know what ismeant, when it is said, that an imperceiving substance hath inherent in It and supports either
Ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the
whole no parity of case between spirit and matter.
HYLAS. I own my self satisfied in this point.**
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tory proof* of other finite spirits has actually been given.
The existence of God, the infinite percelver, sufficiently
explains the existence of sensible things, leaving the exist
ence of other finite spirits superflous.
Berkeley makes the claim in his dialogue with which
we have been dealing, that he understands what he means when
he says a spiritual substance supports ideas.

We should re

call that this very point had been made against material sub
stance.

The opponent, Hylas, had been unable to explain what

he meant by matter supporting its accidents.

Since he could

not do so, this was taken as an argument against the existence
of matter.

Tet Philonous here asserts that he knows the mean

ing of spiritual substance supporting ideas.

Conveniently

however, he is not challenged to explain his meaning and he
does not volunteer the information.
This line of thought leads up to some very significant
inquiries.
spirits?

How do sensible tilings exist in the minds of finite
Moreover, if sensible things are independent of fi-

note perceivers with regard to their existence, what is the
difference between their existence in finite perceivers and in
God?

Indeed, how can ideas which are purely passive be in God

at all since he is pure act? Berkeley does not say that ideas
25
are not in God, but he fails to explain his position suffiS

'

'

'

Dial,, II, 213f. MI do not understand how our Ideas,
which are things altogether passive and inert, can be the
essence, or any part Tor like any part) of the essence or sub
stance of God, who is an Impassive, indivisible, purely active
being.*
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eiently.

God causes the things we perceive to exist hut

since their very existence consists in being perceived,
then how can we say they are not part of God?

In other

words, his esse est percipi principle seems to involve an
implicit pantheism which the Anglican Bishop would certainly reject.^

In fact, he seems completely unaware of any

such taint In his thought.
Berkeley does at least distinguish the way things
are perceived by raen and the \my they are perceived by God.
We are affected by impressions of sense, and gain our know
ledge through sensation.

But this is an imperfection, and

God, Who is pure spirit, cannot be subject to any imperfec27
tions.
God knows all things but not through sensation.

---- gg-------------- -------------

G. Arnold, p. 119 f., also points out that pantheism
seems to be the logical result of Berkeley’s system. Luce,
p. 22, writes: **Berkeley was a theist, loyal to his creed,
and pantheism was not in him. He believed in the world of
sense which is other than God? he believed in the society
of finite spirits, which is other than God* cf. Ibid., p. 73.
There is no doubt that Berkeley was not a pantheist, but what
Luce, as ’
well as Berkeley, fail to show is how he can logi
cally and consistently avoid a pantheistic position.
27
Dial.. II, 240f. "PHILONOUS, That God knows or
understands" all things, but that he knows among other things
what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what
it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question.
But that God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful
sensations in us, can Him self suffer pain, I positively deny.
\4& who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impres
sions of sense, the effects of an external agent, which being
produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy.
But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives
nothing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and inde
pendent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or
resisted by nothing; it Is evident, such a being as this can
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We still hare not been told how the ideas exist either in us
or in God.

Moreover unless the Divine Ideas are identical

with the Mvine Essence, then God would be imperfect, since
any real distinction would imply composition of parts.

It

seems then that Berkeley should logically equate the Mvine
Ideas with the real existence of sensible things.

But since

this pantheistic position conflicts with his Christian theism,
we cannot expect a satisfactory explanation of how things
exist in God.
Without discussing at this point the various facul
ties of the raind, let us consider at great length the meaning
of mind or spirit for Berkeley. *4 spirit is one simple undi
vided active being.”28

fhe key word in the above description

active. This characteristic of activity sets spirit in
direct contrast to ideas or sensible things whose passivity
has been so vehemently stressed.
However, on the distinction between the mind and its
ideas, Berkeley does not maintain a consistent opinion.

In

the Philosophical Commentaries he indites, rtfhe very existsuffer nothing, nor he affected with any painful sensation
or indeed any sensation at all....To know everything is
certainly a perfection; but to enture, to suffer, or fool any
thing by sense, is an imperfection, The former, I say, agrees
to Sod, but not the latter. God knows or hath ideas; but His
ideas are not convey’d to Him by sense, as ours are.M
28
Princ., Part I, par. 27, (II, 52).
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©nee of Ideas constitutes the soul* and again in this same
work, “Take away Perceptions & you take away the Mind* and
even more forcefully, “Say you the Mind is not the Percep
tion’s hut that thing which perceives.

I answer you are

abus’d by the words that & thing these are vague empty words
20

without a meaning.* J

The mind is identified with its ideas,
30
in a position which sounds very much like that of Hume.

But since ideas are passive, and the mind active, how can
the mind be a mass of ideas any more than it can be one idea?
In the third mid final dialogue between Hylas and
Philonous, Berkeley’s spokesman gives this reverse view, *1
my self am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking active
principle that perceives, knows, wills and operates about
ideas.* 31

Here we have a complete volte-face. The two

--------- 23-------------------------------------------------------------

P.O., par. 580, 581, (I, 72). Although we cannot
always take positions out of the P.O. and attribute them to
Berkeley, yet it Is clear here that he endorses this position,
and moreover, It does fit in with his thought at least as
well as the contrary position that ideas are distinct from
the spirit in which they reside,

30
Hume, A Treatise on Hum. Bnd., Bk. I, Part 17, sec.
The mind is *nothing but a bundle or collection
of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and move
ment. ...There are the successive perceptions only, that con
stitute the mind.* Hume seems to mean that the self is
always changing, so that there Is really no personal identity.
Berkeley uses the word “congeriesM, (P.O. par, 580), which
stresses the combination of all our perceptions rather than
their mutability.
6 , (p. 253).

31
Dial., II, 233. The first edition was published in
1713. The* philosophical Goipiaentari.es were written in 1707-8
although published onlyposthumously.
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positions are quite clearly opposed and cannot be harmon—
ized.
But this later position involves a difficulty which.
Berkeley himself pointed out in the third text from the
Philosophical Commentaries quoted above* wThat thing which
perceives" is an abstraction, "vague empty words."

If the

being of the mind consists in perceiving, which is an activ
ity, then how could Berkeley speak of it as a substance?
That which acts should be distinguished from its activity, 32
although there is no such distinction in Descartes, 33 who
may have influenced Berkeley on this point.

But if the per

ceiving thing or thinking thing is identified with the sub
stance, then other activities should be excluded.

To say

that activities such as imagining, willing etc., are merely
forms of thought is arbitrary and dodges the problem.

Berke

ley Is caught either way; if he abstracts the substance from
its activity he is violating one of his own tenets; if he
Identifies the substance with its perception he cannot explain
the various activities observable in man.
^
-----------------------------Warnock, p. 205f., criticizes Berkeley on this same
point "Surely to speak of something as a substance is to claim
that it can somehow be distinguished from what it does."
33

Descartes, Meditations, Med. II, (Vol. VII, p. 28),
**Sed quid igitur sum? lies dogiians, Quid eat hoc? Nempe
dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens,
imaginans quoque, Sc senileas," Of. Prineipia Philosophise.
I, 62, (Vol. VIII, p. 30).
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If we return to the description of mind as the
"congeries of Ideas**, we can discover another obstacle.
Unity and simplicity would be lacking. And following from
this, immortality, which is of great importance to Berkeley.
He is most emphatic in his affirmations on the continued
existence of the soul after death.

For if the mind is

merely the gathered mass of ideas then there is patently no
real unity.

Without unity the soul is divisible, composed

of parts and hence there would be no immortality by nature.
Moreover, if the mind is merely a bundle of perceptions,
then each mind would be essentially different; there would
be no human nature.

Such a position contradicts very strik

ingly the tenor of Berkeley’s thought.

On this count there

fore and also because of the meaning of idea for Berkeley,
it seems necessary for the Bishop of Oloyne to reject this
earlier position.

But the later position which distinguishes

the perceiver from his ideas does not, as we have seen, fit
his thought either, clashing as It does with his stand on
abstract ideas.
In the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley says
that spirit does signify a "real thing", but once again he
merely refers to it as "that which perceives ideas.** ^

53

Vide, P. C. par, 814.
par. 141, (II, 105f);Ale., VI,
and VIII, (VII, 9-15;W-113).

It

'

(I. 97); Brine.. Part I.
112, (IIl7 W ) ; Sermons I

Prine., Part I, par. 139, (II, 104). This work was
first published in 1710.
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seems that Berkeley was unable to solve the problem himself;
he could not give a clear and consistent meaning to spirit
ual substance but was unwilling to discard this notion. His
failure was due not to any lack of intellectual acumen, but
rather to his doctrine on abstract ideas which should logi
cally exclude all substance whether spiritual or material as
an empty, unknowable abstraction.
If we recall Berkeley’s general proof for the existence of spiritual substance which was presented above,

we

shall note that it implies a distinction between spirit and
the ideas which inhere in it.

For in this argument, spirit

is presented as an active being which causes ideas.

Such a

being is manifestly distinct from the Ideas it causes and its
existence consists in perceiving. "The existence of Active
things is to act, of inactive to be perceived.1*^
Perhaps if we pursue this basic distinction between
the existence of spirits and that of ideas, it will help us
to penetrate deeper into Berkeley’s understanding of spirit.
First of all, we might point out that, in M s phenomenolog
ical approach to philosophy, Berkeley is not aiming at a phi
losophy of being.

He is not concerned with the existence of

things as such, "the Schools coined the word Existence sup
posed to stand for an abstract general Idea."

To say merely

^

---------

Vide supra, p. 28f.
57
P.O., par. 673, (I, 82).
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that a thing exists is meaningless for Berkeley; existence
as a predicate tells us nothing, fhe term ^existence* as
■5C0

applied to active and passive things is, moreover equivocal.
For *to act” and *to he perceived* are distinct and to some
extent contraries, since being perceived is one way of being
acted upon.

Even though existence is always considered in

terms of perception, whether perceiving or being perceived,
the equivocation does not seem to be avoided, although it is
perhaps not as readily noticed.
It would seem more appropriate to say that the
essence of active things is to act, since Berkeley is inter
ested, not in the act of existing but in what things are.
Berkeley, however, is not much concerned with a distinction
between the essence and the act of existing.

His treatment

of existence does tend to treat existence itself as an essence.
However, to say that he is dealing with the essence rather than
the existence of active things would be an oversimplification.
His philosophy does not seem to lend itself to a transposition
into the language of essence and esse.
If the existence of spirits is to act, how are God and
man to be distinguished in this respect? Berkeley does say that
Of. G* Lascaris, ’’Gonsecuentias de las reduce!on del
ser del yo, eonsistente en percibira ser percibido”, Revista
Rilosofia. 13 (Juil. 1954). Lascaris notes this equivocation on
page"'
“Has encontramos, pues, en Berkeley, con dos formulas
compleraentarias: eese=percipi, esse = percipere. Con dos
*clases8, de existencia: la ae las" ideas (= ser percibidas), y
la de las sustancias espirituales (= percibir). Ehtre ambas
clases de existencia hay heterogeneidad complete, al ser el
esse termino equfvoco."
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the scholastic teaching on analogy is a ttgood notion* and
defends it in relation to our knowledge of God.-^

in this

case our activity could he considered limited and finite
whereas the activity of God is infinite, or God is said to
he actus purus. Berkeley also speaks of God as the only
being whose existence is necessary, while the existence of
men is only contingent*
However, Berkeley also said that there were no degrees
of existence.

In his fourth letter to Samuel Johnson, the
40
American philosopher,
he states that to speak of existing
^raore* makes no sense; such talk is the result of an abstract
idea of existence.

Bit since existence follows from being

perceived and something is either perceived or It is not per
ceived, then there is no room for degrees of existence. Here
Berkeley seems to be thinking along the lines that a thing
either exists or it does not exist.

This is an employment in

the order of metaphysics of the principle of demonstration,
which is a logical principle.

In logic this is certainly a

basic principle and its validity is manifest. Bit to use it
as a metaphysical principle is disastrous.

This means that

you would say of a particular existing thing, that either it
exists or it does not exist.

This is not in aecord with one

who purportedly accepts the evidence of the senses.
'

J9

It should

^ ^

Ale.. V, 17, IS, (III, 163-165).

40
Vol. II, p. 293.
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be clear that the particular existing thing does exist.
Otherwise you will be tending toward an idealist position.
The example used by the Bishop of Cloyne refers to the exist
ence of sensible things but there is no indication that the
position of no degrees of existence is to be thus restricted.
Would he not also agree that a spiritual being either per
ceives or it does not perceive and that there is similarly
no place for degrees of existence in this case?
The notion of analogy^ as applied to active beings
would certainly clash with this position, since if there are
no degrees of being, then being is univocal.

There can be

analogy without degrees as when we speak of being as it is
realised in two men, but when analogy is used in reward to
God and man, there must be degrees of existence admitted.

A

univocal understanding of being is in line with the Cartesian
tradition, 42 whereas the doctrine of analogy does not fit
very well into Berkeley’s thought, jarring particularly with
his rejection of abstract ideas.

Bor if we used words such

as existence in an analogous sense, we would have to prescind
----------------------------------------------------

-

H

Baladi explains Berkeley’s use of analogy, p. 140.
"Berkeley distingue entre une perfection prise formellement
et en elle-meme, et le mode d’etre ou d ’exercise de cette
perfection. ^Et bien qu’il y ait une distance infinie entre
les modes d'etre divin et humain, la perfection, formellement
parlant,^est la raeme; mais paroe qu’elle comports en fait des
modes d’etre essentiellement differents, elle est dit plutot
analogue qu’identique.”
42
univocal.
position.

Descartes does not say explicitly that being is
However, his whole philosophy seems to imply this
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from their concrete realization in particular things.

But

if Being is taken as univocal, Berkeley cannot distinguish
God and finite spirits on the level of being.
If, on the other hand, there are degrees of existence
among spiritual beings, although not among sensible things,
what follows?

Jirst of all, existence Is an equivocal term

which means ttto act” or Hto be perceived”, When it means
"to act” it is used analogically and admits of degrees*

When

it is used to mean Mto be perceived” it is univocal, not ad
mitting of more or less,

fhis is hardly a plausible position,

Yet the equivocal meaning of existence is clear as also its
univocal application In regard to sensible things,

fhe only

point which Berkeley does not clarify is the use of existence
as predicated of active beings,

'Whether existence is said to

be univocal or analogical in such cases, many questions have
been left unanswered.
In the next chapter we shall turn to some of the
activities of spiritual beings.

This procedure will assist

us in elucidating the differences between God and man, between
the Infinite and the finite.

The meaning of spirit itself

should come clearer.
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Ill

THE ACTIVITIES OF SPIRITUAL SUBSTA2TCES
Berkeley speaks of various activities of the mind,
although he does not deal with them systematically. In his
writings sensing, imagining, thinking and willing could he
distinguished, and they would correspond to the senses,
imagination, understanding and will, respectively.

Each of

these shall he treated to see if they represent faculties
or powers distinct from a spiritual substance in thich they
reside.
"Thoughts do most properly signify or are mostly
taken for the interior operations of the mind, wherein the
mind is active, those that obey not the acts of volition, &
in which the mind is passive are more properly call’d sensa
tion or perceptions."1

Sensation then as distinguished from

thought is passive, and hence cannot he really called an op
eration or activity of the mind.

We might also note that

perception and sensation are used synonymously. While "there
is somewhat active in most perceptions i.e. such as ensue
upon our volitions, such as we can prevent & stop v.g* I turn
p
my eyes toward the sun I open them all this is active",
1
P.O., par. 286, (I, 35).
2
P.O., par. 67a, (I, 82).
54
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clearly the activity itself is not part of the sensation.

In

the example given, the seeing of the sun, we can turn towards
or away from it hut the actual seeing, the sensation involved,
is passive.

We do not control what we see when our eyes are

directed towards a particular object and this holds true
mutatls mutandis for all the external senses.
In the first Dialogue, Berkeley develops his reasons
for considering perception or sensation to he passives
PHILONOUS. But doth it... depend on your will, that in
looking on this flower, you perceived white rather than
any other colour? On directing your open eyes toward
yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun? Or
is light or darkness the effect of your volition?
HYLAS. No certainly.
PHXIiQNQUS. You are then in these respects altogether passive.
HYLAS. I am.
PHILONOUS. fell me now, whether seeing consists in perceiving
lights or colours, or in opening and' 'turning the eyes?
HYLAS. Without doubt, in the former.
PHILONOUS. Since therefore you are In the very perception of
light and colours altogether passive, what Is become of that
action you were speaking of, as an ingredient of every sensation?3
We have no choice then but to see a particular object
as white or blue or whatever colour it may be, and similarly
with sounds, odours, etc.
from without*

We receive certain sense Impressions

As we saw before the things which appear to

cause these impressions are not the real causes since they are
purely passive but rather God Is their cause. *Now the set rules
or established methods, wherein the mind we depend on excites
in us the ideas of sense, are called the Laws of Natures and
-------------------

M a i ., II, 196f. Warnock supports Berkeley on this
point on page 206. *As he rightly points out in the First
Dialogue. perception is not an action at all.*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56
these we learn by experience which, teaches us that such and
such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas in the
ordinary course of things.rt4
Since sensation is passive the Mexperiencert referred
to in the quotation directly above nay imply something more,
some active power by which we know these "Laws of Nature*.
What then do we know by sensation itself?

Berkeley does very

clearly hold that all knowledge begins with the senses, ap
proving the scholastic axiom HNihil est in intellectu quod
non prius fuit in sensu.H5
It appears however that the senses themselves do not
knows ”sense knows nothing*.

In the same work, Berkeley fur

ther speaks of Mthe phenomena of nature which strike on the
senses and are understood by the mind.*^
Implies that the senses know nothing.

This quotation also

On the other hand Berke

ley does speak of the senses knowing effects or appearances,

?
Brine.. Part

I,

par. 50, (II, 53f).

5
B.C., par. 779, (I, 94). Cf. P.O., par. 559, (I, 67)
*ffoolish £sicl in lien to despise the senses, if it were not
.......the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all.
All... , of Introversion, meditation, contemplation & spiritual
acts as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from
without by the senses are manifestly absurd.* Vide etiam De
Motu, par. 21, (IV, 16).
6
Siris. par. 254, (V, 121).
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7
whereas reason deals with causes and is the guide to truth.
This passage from Siris seems to mean that we know
ideas by sense and causes such as God and other spirits byreason, which directly contradicts the position that sense
knows nothing.

Moreover, to speak of knowing *appearances"

does not seem consonant with our knowledge of things as they
are in themselves, a knowledge which Berkeley has emphasised.
The term *appearances* suggests some more basic reality be
yond sense qualities, such as material substance.

This

statement concerning senses dealing with appearances is isloated, and seems to have been made carelessly.

Consequently

7-------------------------------------------------------------

Siris. par. 253, (7, 120)i "Strictly the sense knows
nothing. We perceive indeed sounds by hearing, and characters
/[lettersJ by sight; but we are not therefore said to under
stand them." Tide etiara par. 264, (7, 124), which has a strik
ing similar!tyTcT*Pia'i'o. "Sense and experience acquaint us with
the cause and analogy of appearances or natural effects.
Thought, reason, intellect introduce us into the knowledge of
their causes. Sensible appearances, though of a flowing,
unstable, and uncertain nature, yet having first occupied the
mind, they do by an early prevention render the aftertask of
thought more difficult; and, as they amuse the eyes and ears,
and are more suited to vulgar uses and the mechanical arts of
life, they easily obtain a preference, in the opinion of most
men, to those superior principles, which are the later growth
of the human mind arrived at maturity and perfection, but,
not affecting the corporeal sense, are thought to be so far
deficient in point of solidity and reality; sensible and real,
to common apprehensions, being the same thing; although it be
certain that the principles of science are neither objects of
sense nor imagination, and that intellect and reason are alone
the sure guides to truth." Of. A. A. Luce, "The Alleged De
velopment of Berkeley’s Philosophy", Mind. Tol. HI, (Jan.
1943). luce, for one, says on p. 150 that there is no change
in Berkeley’s thought in Siris. He concludes his article,
"The alleged development of Berkeleian Philosophy has thus been
examined and exposed. It is a flight of fancy, comparatively
modern, without basis In fact." p. 156.
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we should not hold Berkeley to It but must consider senses
knowing nothing as his preferred opinion on this subject.
Berkeley even gives the reason himself why we cannot
be said to know appearances:
Colour, figure, motion, extension and the like, considered
only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known,
there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But if
they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things
or archetypes existing without the mind, then we are involved
all In" scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the
real qualities of things. ...All this scepticism follows from
our supposing a difference between things and ideas, and that
the former have a subsistence without the mind or inxperceived.
It were easy to dilate on this subject, and shew how the argu
ments urged by sceptics in all ages, depend on the supposition
of external objects’.
Manifestly in this passage Berkeley rejects the idea that we
know only appearances and not the things themselves. What we
see are the sensible qualities which make up things and there
is nothing beyond this; this is reality*

Hence the senses,

even though they know nothing, are struck by phenomena which
should not be called appearances,

To say the senses know only

appearances involves us in skepticism* Bather the senses come
in contact with sensible things or ideas which in Berkeley’s
philosophy constitute reality.
In fact there is no distinction between sensation and
9
its object*
For the object is that which Is immediately
perceived, which is also the definition of a sensation.
w

The

------------------------------

Brine.. Part I, par. 87, (II, 78f.) The position
attacked in tills quotation is that held by Locke. Tide An
Bssav gone. Hum. Und., Bk. IT, Oh. IT, See. 8 , 12 TfoT.Tl,
P . 25677^427X7
9
Dial.. II, 194-196,
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only remaining basis for distinguishing sensation and its
object would be to predicate activity of sensation, but we
have already seen that for Berkeley sensation is passive,
The trustworthiness of the senses is very emphat
ically stated by Berkeley although for the unusual reason
that the sensation and its object are identical.

must

with the Mob place certainty in the senses*^*0 and again,
"Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who
thinks he knows the things he sees and feels and entertains
no doubts of their existence,
The senses do provide us with material, so to speak*
They are the starting-point in any knowledge.

Therefore,

even though they themselves do not, strictly speaking know,
yet they do seem to be powers dr faculties which enable us
to receive sense impressions.

The fact that the senses do

not have a choice when they perceive a particular thing does
not necessarily imply they are completely passive as Berkeley
maintains. 12
---------------------

w

P.O., par. 740, (I, 90).
11
Mai., II, 237f. Gf. P.O. par. 317, Cl, 39), par.
539, (I, 67);Princ.. Part I, par. 88 , (II, 79).
12

St. Thomas Aquinas appears to hold for the passivity
of the external senses. Busiaa Theoiogiae, (cura et studio
Instituti Stuidiorum Mediaevalium, Ottaviensis, Ottawa, Canada,
1941), I pars, ou, 78, art. 3, (Vol. I, p. 475b). wBst autem
sensus quaedam potentia passiva, que nata est immutari ab
exterior! sensibili. Bxterius ergo iiaiautativum est quod per se
a sensu pereipitur et secundum cuius diversitatem sensitatae
potentiae distinguuntur.* It could, however, be argued that
the very power to receive sensations is itself a type of activ
ity. If all our knowledge depends on sense to provide material
for the understanding, then it seems that sense is doing some
thing, that it is, to some extent, active.
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So far we hare only considered sense in man.
sense exist also in God?

Does

On this point Berkeley is most

explicit, "There is no sense nor sensory, nor anything like
sense or sensory in God.

Sense implies an impression from

some other being and denotes a dependence in the soul which
hath it*

Sense is a passion and passions imply imperfection.

God knoweth all things as pure mind or intellect but nothing
by sense nor in nor through a sensory.*'1''*
On this issue of sensation the Infinite Spirit is
radically different from all finite spirits.

Man cannot know

anything without sense; God has no senses since they imply
passivity and imperfection.

Moreover, the things we sense

are external to us, but not to God, for the reality of their
existence consists in being perceived by God,

1A.

The word

“perceived* cannot be identical with ’’sensed** in this context
since God does not in any way sense.
knowledge of things.

It must refer to His

Even when “perception** is used in

regard to us, that is, in regard to finite spirits, more than
sensation is at times implied, since the senses do not pre
cisely know and in some Instances perception appears to mean
knowledge.

Yet as we have already seen, Berkeley generally

identifies perception and sensation.

In at least one place,

perception, sensation and thought are all lumped together as
--------- 13------------------------------------------------------------

Siris, par, 289, (?, 134).
14
V M e supra, p. 3 4 .
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meaning the same thing. 15

Naturally then we will have diffi

culty in deciding whether perception means sensation or
thought, and can only attempt to interpret as accurately as
36
the context allows.
The distinction between sensation and
thought will also present difficulty.

Such verbal imprecision

is, as we have already observed, not rare in the writings of
Berkeley.
Are the senses faculties distinct from the soul or
mind in which they reside?

Berkeley does speak, although he

is somewhat obscure, of the external senses as distinct facul
ties or powers.

Moreover as we have tried to bring out, his

P.O. par. 299, (I, 37), "But say you the thought or
perception I call extension is not itself in an unthinking
thing or matter. But it is like something which is in matter.
Well, say I, do you apprehend or conceive what you say extension
is like unto or do you not. If the latter, how know you they
are alike, how can you compare any things besides your own
ideas, if the former it must be an idea i.e perception thought,
or sensation which to be In an imperceiving thing is a Contra
diction."
16
Of, Willis Doney, "Two Questions About Berkeley",
The Philosophical Review, LSI, (1952) p. 338f. Doney points
out tliai Berkeley Is not consistent on the activity or passivity
of perceptions. Doney does not give reasons for this inconsist
ency but perhaps it is due to Berkeley’s use of the word "percep
tion* to mean "sensation* in some instances and "knowledge"in
others.
17
Siris, par. 303, (V, 140) "Though harmony and propor
tion are not" objects of sense, yet the eye and the ear are
organs which offer to the mind such materials by means whereof
she may apprehend both the one and the other. By experiments
of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of the
soulj and from them, whether by a gradual evolution or ascent,
we arrive at the highest."
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whole line of thought on the senses seems to indicate that
they are powers or faculties.

Berkeley himself, however,

has not argued to this conclusion.

We shall have to look

at the other powers before we can answer this question more
definitely,

Then we shall be in a better position to ascer

tain whether the soul or mind is distinguished from its
faculties, whether the faculties are distinguished among them
selves and finally whether powers are distinguished from oper
ations. We might note that Berkeley does at least have a tend
ency to maintain these distinctions, as his writings on the
external senses indicate.

But these distinctions are not

made in the Cartesian tradition in which he is situated.
Accordingly we can expect some confusion in his thought on
the mind and its powers.
The only internal sense which is given any treatment
by Berkeley is imagination, or Mfancy”, as he frequently calls
it, and even here the amount of space devoted is relatively
slight.

In fact, Berkeley does not seem to be interested in

imagination for its own sake; rather he wishes to explain how
real and imaginary things are still distinguished within the
framework of his thought,
”1 find that I can exite ideas in my mind at pleasure,
and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit.

It is no

more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in
my fancy*

and by the same power it is obliterated, and makes

way- for -anothcr.- This—making -and unteaking of ideas doth very
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properly denominate the mind active,*^®

When we Imagine

ideas we are active but is this activity purely volitional
or is the imagination itself an active power?
In Siris. Berkeley writes, “Sense supplies images
to memory,

These become subjects for fancy to work upon,*^

By fancy he is very elearly referring to imagination but
what does “work upon* imply?

Although Berkeley does not de

velop the point any further on this occasion, it does appear
that the work done by the imagination is to frame Ideas which
are of our own choosing rather than imposed upon us by an ex
ternal agent.

Consequently we could say that the imagination

is an active power.

20

The ideas which are summoned up by im

agination are not however entirely new, but must have first
been in sensation.

They are new to the extent that we are not

now sensing the idea invoked and indeed we may never have
sensed this idea as such,

Berkeley would probably say, for

example, that we can have an image of a centaur or a phoenix
by combining sensations in a way in which we have never expe18
'
Brine,, Bart I, par. 28, {II, 53).
19
Siris. par. 303, (V, 140).
20
Of. J. W. Bavis, “Berkeley’s Doctrine of the lotion*
Review of Metaphysics. 12, (Har. 1959) p. 379. Davis feels
that the idea's of Imagination do manifest the activity of the
mind, although he does not make clear whether the imagination
itself is an active distinct faculty in Berkeley. “Ideas of
imagination are evidence of the activity of the mind in the
sense that the mind is capable of compounding, dividing or
barely representing those ideas originally received from sense
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rienced them.

But the imagination ie nevertheless always

dependent on previous sensation for its materials.

21

“The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of
Nature are called real things: and those excited in the
imagination being less vivid and constant, are more properly
termed ideas or images of things, which they copy or repre
sent

The imagination depends on the senses which have as

their object real things.

Without this material from the

senses the imagination cannot function.

But it takes their

material and frames at will hew ideas which copy the old
ideas and which are not so vivid or coherent, since there is
no necessary order or structure among them.

They are subject

to our own caprice.
The point which Berkeley wishes to make clear in his
whole treatment of the distinction between objects of sense
and objeets of imagination is that, although both are ideas,
the distinction between real things and things which are the
product of our own fancy remains: “There is a rerum naturae
and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its
•

n

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

C.
Arnold observes that the imagination can only
“compound and divide* what it has already received from sense,
“the data of sense* as he puts it. p, 82,
22

Brine., Bart I, par, 33, (II, 54)*
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full force.**23
In reference to God, Berkeley makes no mention of
imagination, not even to deny Its existence in Him,

To try

and deduce what Berkeley’s position should be in terms of
his overall philosophy seems pointless for we surely cannot
ascribe to Berkeley all that he ought to hold In the light
of his principles.

Whatever the merit of such a procedure,

it would not be a treatment of his philosophy and accordingly
we shall not attempt it.
We have seen that imagination and sensation are
treated as two separate powers with distinct objects, namely
images of things and real things.

The further problem of

distinguishing imagination from spiritual substance, we shall
postpone until after we have dealt with understanding and will.
Since Berkeley’s remarks on understanding and will
are so Interlaced, we shall treat both together where it is
expedient to do so. **A spirit is one simple, undivided, active
being: as it perceives Ideas, It Is called the understanding.
and as It produces or otherwise operates about them, it is
called the will. **24 The understanding Is presented here as the
--------- 2 3 ---------------------------------------------------- —

Brine.. Bart I, par. 34, (I, 55).

--------

In a parody of
t h i s W a m o o V w r i t e s ; "the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n r e a l i t i e s and
chimeras has not quite vanished, but it does not retain its full
force.*1 Wamock quites correctly criticizes the inadequacy of
Berkeley’s use of the vividness, coherence and order of ideas,
as a criterion for distinguishing ideas of sense from those of
imagination.
24
Brine.. Bart I, par. 27, (II, 52).
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power by which we perceive or know ideas*

The word “percep-

iiontt in this context clearly means knowledge*

This process

of knowledge is described by the Irish Bishop when he speaks
of “the phenomena of nature which strike on the senses and
are understood by the mind.”

The understanding then must be

active; it operates on the sense impressions and knows them.
The will on the other hand causes ideas, as Sod
causes our ideas, or as we cause

our

own ideas of imagination.

All our ideas of sense would be caused by God, and not by our
own will.

What is meant by “otherwise operating on ideas*1,

is not made explicit by Berkeley.

He could mean the combining

of ideas or the abstracting of some quality and Its separate
consideration.

But since there is no distinction between an

image and a concept as we saw in

the

first chapter, itisdif

ficult to see how this combining

and

abstracting couldbedis

tinguished from the work of the imagination.

It can be said at

least that the will is active and its activity differs from that
of the intellect, since it produces rather than perceives ideas.
On the distinction of the intellect from its ideas and
the will from its volitions, Berkeley is not consistent.

In

the Philosophical Commentaries he speaks of “The understanding
not distinct from particular volitions’1^-* let later In the
same work he writes, ”1 must not say that the understanding
differs not from the particular Ideas, or the will from partic-------------------------------------------

P.O., par, 614, 615, (I, 76). Cf. P.O., par. 587,
(I, 13)*
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ular Ideas, or the will from particular volitions.*^

«^e in

consistency cannot be explained away by having recourse to
the disparity in earlier and later works.

It involves the

discussion of the spirit and its ideasj we shall return to It
after we have treated the understanding and will in relation
to spirit.
In Siris. Berkeley says the intellect Is distinguished
71
from the will by operation. ' Neither the intellect wills
nor the will understands, although the will is conducted or
applied by the intellect.

This alone would seem to demand

that the intellect and will are two distinct powers.

For

each performs a different operation and both are expressly
28
said to be active.
Moreover error is not said to be in the Intellect but
in the will, a position which is seemingly taken over from
29
Descartes.
Berkeley offers no explanation why error is in
the will rather than in the intellect.

It Is quite possible
P.O., par. 848, (I, 101) This may represent a very
early development within this one work.
27
Siris, par, 253, {7, 120).
28
Tide P.O.. par* 821, (I, 98) for understanding as
active; parTTzi, (I, 76) for will as active.
29
Of. Descartes, Meditationes. Med. IT, (Tol. 711,
p. 58). HUnde ergo nascuniur mei erroresT"Mempe ex hoc uno
quod, cum latius pateat voluntas qua® intellectus ilia® non
intra eosdem limites eontineo, sed eiiam ad ilia quae non
intelligo extendoj ad quae cum sit indifferens, facile a vero
& bono defiestit, atque Ita & fallor & peeeo.M
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that Berkeley has been taught this Cartesian position and
never bothered to question the point.

However, it may well

be that Berkeley’s connection of error and abstract ideas
and error and will are related.

Abstract ideas are a major

source of confusion and error according to Berkeley.

All

skepticism and atheism would be shattered if they were re
jected.

Bit the mind cannot actually frame an abstract idea;

this is an impossibility.

Berkeley might mean that to try

to use abstract ideas is an act of the will, not of the
intellect.

As in Descartes* explanation, the will would be

going beyond its competence; it would be acting blindly, We
cannot be certain of this relation between error and abstract
ideas and error and vd.ll because Berkeley does not sufficient
ly develop his position.

We can see in any case that the dis

tinction between intellect and will is supported further ay
his remarks on the source of error.
But this distinction is not always maintained.

Even in

the Philosophical Commentaries Berkeley can says HThe under
standing, desire, Hatred etc. so far forth as they are acts
or active differ not, all their difference consists in their
objects, circumstances, etc.*50

Since the objects of the

intellect and will are different, will not their acts also be
different and hence are they not distinct powers?

In Siris.

Berkeley does mention that philosophers commonly distinguish
55--------------------- --------------- -------------------- ------

P.O., par. 614a (I, ?6 ); par. 854, (I, 101),
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faculties according to their operations, but he fails to
31
make clear whether or not he shares in this opinion.
Since he says that the intellect and will do not differ as
active, it would seem that they could not be distinguished
according to their operations.

Yet he offers no explana

tion as to why intellect and will do not differ as active
or as powers when they have different objects.
The consideration of intellect and will in God may shed
some light on our problem. BThere is in the Deity understand
ing as well as will.8^

In the case of God there is no real

distinction between his essence and his faculties.

To speak

of intellect and will in God Is anthropomorphic and cannot be
understood in the strict literal sense.

The distinction Is

supposedly made to enable us to understand God better with
our limited language and intelligence.

Although Berkeley does

not spell out such a doctrine In so many words, he would un
doubtedly agree.

But does he go farther and apply this to

finite splints?

Is there no real distinction for Berkeley

between essence and faculties in all spirits, whether finite
or infinite?
In the text which we used to introduce this portion of
the chapter, Berkeley spoke of the spirit as it perceives
•Z5

ideas and as it produces them.

This could be a hint, an

5 1 -----------------------------~ ~ ---------------------------

Siris. par. 254, (7, 121).
32
P.O., par. 812, (I, 97).
33
Brine.. Bart I, par. 27, (II, 52).
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indication, that Berkeley does not make any real distinc
tion between the spirit and its faculties, although it
could merely mean that the active being perceives or pro
duces ideas through its powers which are really distinct.
However Berkeley is more explicit elsewhere, HI must not
mention the Understanding as a faculty or part of the Mind,
I must include Understanding & Will etc, in the word spirit
by which I mean all that is active,*^4

Earlier in this sane

work he writes s **fhe soul is the will properly speaking & as
it is distinct from ideas,*^5
There is no interpretation of Berkeley’s remarks on
intellect and will as distinct, or not distinct, from one
another and as distinct, or not distinct, from spirit which
can harmonize all the texts.

However it does seem that his

preferred opinion is to deny any real distinction either
between intellect and will or between intellect and will and
spirit.

Besides the explicit statements noted above, this

interpretation is further supported by Berkeley’s referring
to understanding and will as abstract ideas, *1 must not say
Will and Understanding are all one but that they are both
Abstract, Ideas i.e* none at all* they not being even ratione
different from the Spirit, Qua faculties, or Active.®^
^4
~
'
P.O., par. 848, (I, 101).
35
B.C., par. 478a, (I, 60).m
36
B.C., par. 871, (I, 103). G» Arnold, commenting
on this text and referring to Brine., Bart I, par. 27,
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If they are to be considered ideas at all, then
surely intellect and xd.ll are abstract ideas according to
Berkeley's understanding of the words.

For we do not per

ceive intellect and will by the senses, and can form no
image of them.
abstract Ideas.

Consequently they would be for Berkeley
But since they are active, it would seem

that we should not speak of having Ideas of them at all,
whether abstract or otherwise.

Ideas apply only to passive

things, but intellect and will do not belong to this Catego
ry-

Following Berkeley's terminology we can strictly
speaking only have "notions’* of Intellect and will, that is,
we can know them from the effects we observe.

Shis is the

way we know the existence of other finite spirits.

Me ob

serve activities and argue back to a spiritual substance
which causes them,

Gould we analyse this activity and argue

further that there are different faculties in spiritual beings
each corresponding to a different mode of activity?

Berkeley

himself does not do so, although when he speaks of the various
powers of spirits It does appear that he distinguishes them
because he has experienced various activities in men.

In

summary we might observe that when Berkeley explicitly treats
of the distinction between intellect and will, and intellect
(aI,~" 5’
2 ), also tMhks that" the' soul' and’its faculties" canjio’
t
be considered distinct in Berkeley. "Substance is only
logically distinct from Its accidents", p. 90. fhis statement
also" supports the view that there is no real distinction
between the spirit and its faculties, p. 119d.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12

and will and spirit he tends to deny any real distinction.
Yet when his whole treatment of spirit, intellect and will
seems to imply that there are real distinctions,

The former

position would be a reflection of his Cartesianisa, the latter
a more independent and more reasonable stand.
But if Berkeley really does identify spirit with its
intellectual and volitional activities, and as we have seen
that he probably does so, then it seems that his remarks on
intellect and will are just so much idle verbiage.

Bit not

he himself call these words abstract ideas?

For Berkeley

what could be a more devastating criticism?

And still he has

not even taken the pains to explain, as he might, that these
distinctions are made merely to facilitate our understanding
and are not to be applied literally to reality.

Of course,

if intellect and will are abstract ideas, they will not even
serve to help our understanding but would only add error and
confusion.
There is another possibility offered by Berkeley al
though it does not actually solve any problems.

It is to

identify the spirit with the will; the intellect with its
ideas.

There are indications in Berkeley that all activity

3'
involves the will and he says explicitly, '’the soul is will**,
This would entail admitting that none of the other powers are
— ■
------ — ■
Tide, P.O., par. 712, (I, 875 "The spirit the Active
Thing that "which is Soul & God is the Vill alone Tine Ideas
are effects impotent things,**
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active and that the essence of spirit or will is to be active.
Such a position is consistent with Berkeley1s remarks on spir
itual substance which stresses activity as the key note.

How

ever, the other powers, at least the imagination and under
standing, seem to involve activity and to be an essential part
of spirit*
Furthermore to identify the intellect with its ideas
would seem to reduce intellect to the level of the external
senses which are merely acted upon but do not themselves know
or act in any way,

Such a reduction does not harmonize with

Berkeley's treatment of understanding, although in one way the
understanding Is a sort of sense power,

For the understanding

knows sense impressions and would be traditionally called a
sense power because of this,

looked at from this point of view,

sensation would be both passive and active; passive in the case
of the external senses, active in the case of the understanding.
3ven so understanding is still active and cannot therefore be
identified with its ideas which are purely passive.

*58

Sensation in its passive phase also seems to be dis
tinct from the spirit or mind since it enables the mind to
--------- 3S---------------------------------------- --------------------

luce thinks that Berkeley very emphatically distin
guishes mind and ideas, *MInd is mind, for him, and ideas are
ideas, and the Wain never merge. Hind is mind, for him, and
ideas are not-mind. Mind and ideas, being intirely [sic]
distinct, the two are two and are never one, Berkeleyts dec
laration is coupled with hie first allusion to existence in
the mind, and is all the more impressive on that account. It
Is as if he meant to warn his readers that they are bound to
misunderstand him unless they keep what is in the mind intirely
distinct from the mind itself.* p. 51 . W. honey believes that
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receive something*

We can prescind at this point from the

dispute over the activity or passivity of such a receptive
power*

Whether or not we call sensation* or rather the ex

ternal senses, powers appears to he merely a verbal issue,
hut the distinction of these senses from the spiritual sub
stance is, in terms of Berkeley’s own thought, necessary.
To be more exact we should say, ailthough this would not be
according to Berkeley’s mode of expression, that man acts
through his senses.

But man could not do so if he were pure

will.
The intellect and will must also be distinguished
from spirit or mind.

For if the will is identified with

spirit, with the essence of man, then clearly there is no
room for any other type of activity in man.

For if spirit is

will then it must be always willing and could do nothing else.
Similarly with intellect, and when Berkeley says the man is
59
always thinking,
he seems to be defending the position that
man is a thinking thing.

This radical view is dogmatically

asserted, unverified by experience or by any form of argu
mentation and seems strange for an empiricist,
this distinction is clear" in the Principle's. “v&iether "the"
Huxnian passages in the Philosophical dommentarles can be
adequately accounted for on the basis' of a change of termi
nology or whether they express an earlier opinion that was
discarded, there is no doubt that when Berkeley wrote the
Principles, he meant to distinguish the mind and its ideas.*
p.
P.O. par. 651, (I, 79) “Certainly the mind always
& constantly thinks. ** Descartes had also defined man as
thinking thing and should logically have held that man is
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In Siris. the distinction between the powers, al
though not clearly delineated, is at least very definitely
indicateds
The perceptions of sense are gross; hut even in the senses
there is a difference. Though harmony and proportion are
not objects of sense, yet the eye and the ear are organs
which offer to the mind such materials by means whereof she
may apprehend both the one and the other. By experiments
of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of
the soul; and from them, whether by a gradual evolution or
ascent we arrive at the highest. Sense supplies images to
memory. These become subjects for fancy to work upon.
Reason considers and judges of the imaginations, And these
acts of reason become new objects to understanding. In this
scale, each lower faculty naturally leads to the Deity, which
is rather the object of intellectual knowledge than even of
the discursive faculty, not to mention the sensitive. There
runs a chain throughout the whole system of beings.40
This is the only text in which any reference is made
to a hierarchy of faculties.

The lower faculties are said to

assist the higher but the will is not even mentioned*

Imag

ination seems to have a role not elsewhere noted; a role as
intermediary between the senses and the intellect even when
the objects of sense are involved.

The distinction between

reason and understanding is not one usually employed by Berke
ley,

The whole passage suggests the influence of scholastic

philosophy, which he does not generally accept.

It would not

be possible simply from this paragraph to determine with any
precision just what each faculty does.

The descriptions of

their activities are too brief and sketchy to render fruitful

always txilhklhg' although" he 'does '"hot explicitly say so.
Tide Heditatlones, Med. II, (Vol. TO, p. 26).
40
Siris. par, 503, (V, 140).
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any such, attempt.
It is patent that Berkeley has not clearly thought
out his position on spiritual substance and its various
powers.

He could have taken the facile but consistent method

of labeling all such discussions as abstract and empty*

Such

a stand could be justified in terms of his philosophy but he
41
did not choose this escape.
He has talked about spirit,
will, understanding etc. though in a sporadic manner, with
some apparently contradictory statements, with undeveloped
assertions and without attempting any overall harmony,
In reading his works an explanation for this confusion
suggested itself and we have alluded to it earlier. Berkeley
has glossed over the distinction between finite and infinite
spirits.

In God the distinction between his substance and

his powers Is not real and often God is equated with his thought
or his will etc.

When applied to God such Identifications can

not be disputed.

But it Is certainly objectionable to do so

with man.
Yet this Is what Berkeley has, in effect, done.

Hot

that he explicitly says this, nor would he even accept such an
------Oolin I"!. Turbayne, "Berkeley's two Concepts of fTind*
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. XX, (Sept. 1959;
presents' a very ihierest'ing view of two”concepts of mind which
run through Berkeley’s thought, The first is that of mind as
active, distinct from ideas, with intellect and will. This
concept he feels is inconsistent with the rest of Berkeley’s
system, p. 85. The second concept would consider the mind as
substance to be metaphorical and the distinction of mind and
its faculties as an abstract idea. This concept is supposedly
latent in Berkeley’s thought and the one which he really held.
Turbayne refers to P.O., par. 6J7, 658, 701, 777, 829I Brine..
Part I, par. 27; Ale. VIII, 28 to support this position, pp. §092.
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equation of man said God as spirit.

However, if man is con

sidered in this way, namely, if there is no real distinction
"between his substance and his powers, then Berkeley’s state
ments about man being will or ideas etc. make sense.

That

Berkeley has, in effect, done so is further supported by the
fact that there is no distinction made between man and God as
spirit, as active, or as will,
Even with this interpretation, all our problems are
not solved.

Sensation as well as imagination would remain

unexplained in man.

Nevertheless such an approach does appear

to explain more of the numerous inconsistencies in Berkeley’s
thought on this issue than any other.

Moreover if Berkeley

has unconsciously and unintentionally made man too much like
God then certain insoluble difficulties will arise*

For he

does say things about man which will not apply to God; man is
not purely active nor infinite, nor perfect.

Hence the whole

treatment of spirit and its powers will be charged with contra
dictions because of two irreconcilable notions of man, both of
which have influenced his thought.
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IV

CONCLUSION
On the basis of the amount of space devoted to it,
spiritual substance seems to be of secondary importance in
Berkeley’s philosophy.

Actually, however, spirits, whether

infinite or finite, God or man, are of the utmost concern
for Berkeley.

C. M. Turbayne remarks on this point: '♦Very

little attention has been given to Berkeley’s doctrine of
mind either by Berkeley himself or by his critics.

This is

strange, because mind is the central concept in his system.*^
One of the reasons for the lack of material on spirits
is, as we mentioned In the Preface, the loss of Part II of the
Principles. There is no doubt that Berkeley intended to write
this work, but the exact condition of the manuscript at the
time of its loss cannot be ascertained.

In the second letter

to Johnson, Berkeley wrote: "As to the second part of xay trea
tise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. the fact is
I had made considerable progress in it; but the manuscript was
lost about fourteen years ago, during my travels in Italy, and
1

---------

Art. cit.. p. 85. Vide etiaxn Bdward A. Sillera, George
Berkeley and the Proofs for the Ikiistenoe of God, (Longmans,
Green and'Co.V Xonion, 19575, p.’lO'lV Sillem expresses a similar
thought: "He regarded the knowledge of spirits, of our own souls,
and the souls of other people, rather than the knowledge of ideas,
as being fundamental."
78
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I never had leisure since to do so disagreeable a thing as
writing twice on the same subject.82

The phrase "considerable

progress® is rather indefinite but at least it is clear that
Berkeley did not produce a finished work on the subject.

It

may very well be that such an ex profeaso work was not pro
duced chiefly because he was unable to resolve the conflicts
in his thought.
His interest in spirits is manifested in his own con
cern to combat skepticism and atheism, not merely for the sake
of winning an argument, but to spread the positive doctrines
of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul.
The "Preface" to the Principles begins, "What I here make
public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seem*d to me
evidently true, and not unuseful to be known, particularly to
those who are tainted with scepticism, or want a demonstration
of the existence and immortality of God, or the natural immo
rtality of the s o u l . I t seem® patent that his real interest
lies in God, and in man as a spiritual being, in spite of the
fact that Part I of the Principles, (which is the only part
extant), devotes very little space to these subjects.
What Berkeley wishes to do in the Principles and like
wise In the Dialogues is to lay the foundation for the knowledge
I
'
’
Vol. II, p, 282. This letter was written in 1?29* Vide
etlaa Dial. II, 167 where hementions the proposed Part II oT
tKe Principles.
3
Vol. II, p, 23.
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of spirits by digging out errors which dispose men toward
skepticism and atheism.

In his opinion, and it Is a reason

able one, unless certain erroneous views are extirpated first,
it is futile to proceed to the discussion of spiritual sub
stance,

Certainly this is good pedagogy, even if we do not

agree with Berkeley on the question of which doctrines lead to
skepticism and atheism.

In the Principles in the form of a

traditional philosophical treatise, and in the Dialogues in a
more popular and entertaining manner, Berkeley is chiefly con
cerned with the rejection of these fallaceous doctrines.
In our first chapter we dealt with these rejections,
namely, the rejection of abstract ideas, the rejection of the
absolute existence of sensible things apart from their being
perceived (that is, of course, the esse est percipl principle),
and the rejection of material substance*

The rejection of

abstract ideas is basic and is used to prove the other two
positions.

There is a definite development from the rejection

of abstract Ideas, through the esse est percipi to the rejection
of matter.

This last rejection is the most important in the

fight against atheism.^

Matter and God are mutually opposed

as far as Berkeley Is concerned.

If you accept matter and are

consistent, then according to Berkeley you should be an atheist.
But since God exists, (and the Bishop of Cloyne is certain that
?
'
'
'
The Bullish Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, edited
by A. Burtt, (lixlern library,' lew ‘
fork, 1939), p. xix. *The
chief support of atheism and scepticism, he ['BerkeleyJ thought
was the current philosophical and scientific belief in a world
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he does), .matter has to go.
As has been seen the arguments used to establish
these basic tenets are not entirely convincing, except perhaps
to Hylas.

But they do have a greater force when considered

against the background of loeke’s philosophy.

Moreover they

are all tied up together and give a very strong coherence to
the purgative side of Berkeley’s thought,

The esse est percipi

and the rejection of material substance are so closely allied
that once you grasp the meaning of esse est percipi. the re
jection of matter is evident.

The rejection of abstract ideas

prepares the way for both of these, not in the sense that either
position is proved by it alone, but in the sense that both pre
suppose tiois basic rejection,
Berkeley intends these initial doctrines as a pro
paedeutic to the positive side of his philosophy— the realm of
spirit, God and man.

How well do these two parts fit together?

Is there an overall unity in Berkeley’s thought?

If we review

our treatment of spiritual substance, we should be able to
provide an answer to this problem.

It is a problem which gets

at the very heart of Berkeley’s philosophy.
In our second chapter the discussion began with Berke
ley’s views on "notion”, the term he used to designate our knowof‘physical' matter IncVbpendent' of mind and' moving "in accordance
with its own mechanical laws”. Luce, Berkeley*s Imaaterlallsn.
p. 71, as usual agrees with Berkeley tSa’
t dod "and matter are
incompatible. **It is possible to believe both in God and in
matter but it is not easy to do so* The two beliefs where they
are held together remain in a state of uneasy equilibrium; It
is very hard to hold both beliefs together intelligently and
firmly.”
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ledge of spirits as distinct from our knowledge of sensible
things which is through “ideas”« Motional knowledge is characteriaed by its objects, rather than by its immediacy.

5

By

this type of knowledge we know self, other finite spirits,
and God.**

It might appear that “notion” is merely a verbal

subterfuge used by Berkeley to bring into his philosophy some
thing he should reject, namely, spiritual substance.

However,

suoh an Interpretation Is not entirely fair to Berkeley.

It

is true that “notion” is introduced as a convenient term to
distinguish our knowledge of spirits from our knowledge of
ideas.

We sight also note that the “idea” Is the object,

whereas the “notion* is not.
both the

In other words the “idea* is

quo and quod of knowing, while the “notion” is only

the quo. Still the term “notion”, however unsatisfactory it
may be,does not alter Berkeley*s position with regard to spirits.
He does not need this word, fhe question of the coherence of
spiritual substance with his philosophy as a whole cannot be
settled at this level*
fhe existence of self as a spiritual substance is really
asserted, not proved.

Berkeley does say, “We have a notion of

spirit from thought and action*”^
—

3

But he does not actually work

---------------------------------------

Cf. J* 3. Davis, p. 383.
6
Motional knowledge has relations also as its object,
but these do not pertain to our topic. Vide Prime.. Part I,
par. 142, (II, 1055*
i
7
girls, par. 290, (V, 135). Cf. D_e Motu par 10 (IV, 15);
Sillem p. 110, “Berkeley held that the awareness we have of our
own selves Is constituted by our experience both of the perceiving
activity of our mind and the causal activity of our wills.”
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out a proof along these lines,

fhe existence of other finite

spirits depends on our acceptance of self as a spiritual sub
stance.

It would seem more consistent in terms of the rejec

tion of abstract ideas and the esse est percipi principle to
reject spiritual substance also,

fhis would leave self as a
8
"congeries of perceptions" as Berkeley held earlier.
As we

indicated in Chapter II, to say any more than this seems incon
sistent.
fhe proof for the existence of God is circular.

It

depends on the esse est percipi and God in turn is needed as
a principle to support the esse est percipi. In other words,
Berkeley has failed to demonstrate the existence of God philos
ophically.

God is, in effect, a postulate in his philosophy.

Berkeley needs God to avoid skepticism.

For If God does not

exist, then only what is actually perceived by finite perceivers
here and now, exists*

fhis is an extreme position which Berke

ley does not accept, but would it not be more consistent?

Me

will recall that Berkeley did not satisfactorily explain how
things exist in God,

In fact since he equated sensible things

with ideas and ultimately with the ideas In the mind of God,
hb should logically have been a pantheist.

The rejection of

God would eliminate this otherwise insoluble difficulty. Berke
ley cannot accept God and also adequately distinguish him from
the sensible world because of the way In which he interprets
the esse est percipi.
0
P.O., par. 580, (I, 72).
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In dealing with the various faculties or powers of
spirits, many problems were encountered,

fhe exact funotlon

of sense, imagination, understanding and will is difficult to
discern.

Are these faculties, for Berkeley, distinct from

their operations?

Are they distinct from one another? Are

they distinct from the mind or spirit in which they reside?
It aeeras to he Impossible to give a definite answer to any of
these problems.

Berkeley does not offer a consistent expla

nation! Indeed at times he contradicts himself,
If he followed his own rejection of abstract ideas, he
would not even discuss the individual faculties since they are
abstract ideas.

Berkeley himself says this explicitly not

only In the Philosophical goraraentaries. but also in the Prinol
p l e a .^

Berkeley should regard the whole problem of the spirit

and its faculties as just so many empty words.
Onoe he posits the existence of spiritual substance, he
is besieged by problems whieh logically he should not consider.
Moreover once he rejects material substance, he cannot consist
ently hold for the existence of spiritual substance.

He hold

that material substance supporting its accidents did not make
sense, yet he was unable to explain that he meant by a spiritual
substance supporting its ideas.

His attempts to show how the

arguments against material substance do not apply to spiritual
substance are weak and unconvincing.

In terms of his basic

------- 5---------------------------— ----- ---- ---P.O.. par* 871. (I. 103); Brine,. Part I. par. 27
(II, 52f.)j Vide etlam Alo, VIII, lS, (Til, 314),
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tenets, spiritual substance should also be discarded, as it is
by Hume who also accepted these three fundamental positions.
Why it might be asked was Berkeley so inconsistent?
Why has he clung to two philosophies which are incompatible?
His basic principles are those of an empiricist philosophy.
So a large extent it would be true to describe the philosophy
of the Logical Positivists as MBerkeley without GodM. On the
other hand his desire to include Sod and finite spirits in his
philosophy is a result of his Christian faith.

There is it

seems a conflict between Berkeley, the empiricist, and Berkeley,
the Christian.

Perhaps he himself was aware of this conflict

in his earlier days when he wrote in the Philosophical Commen
taries, ttio use utmost Caution not to give the least Handle of
10

offense to the Church or Church—men.*

However, since he did set out to prove the existence
of God and to consider man as a spiritual being, it is more
probable that he was not conscious of this conflict while
writing M s major pMlosophical works.

Berkeley does not seem

to perceive this dichotomy in his thought,

The conflict is

there nevertheless, rendering any overall unity in M s pMlo--------- IS------------- -----------------------------------------------

P.O., par. 715, (I, 87). Turbayne, p. 91f. inter
prets this phrase and also P.%, par. 713, (I, 87) to support
his contention that Berkeley really was consistent with his
basic tenets and did not accept the doctrine of mind which
harmonized with the Christian faith. According to Turbayne,
Berkeley only presented this doctrine of spiritual substance
so as to avoid giving offense to the Church, The evidence for
this interpretation is not sufficient to warrant its acceptance.
Berkeley seems to have been a sincere Christian all M s life.
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sophy impossible.

His thought can be reduced neither to an

empiricism, nor to a doctrine on spirits.

Both sides remain

isolated in spite of his attempts to integrate then.

His

bold attempt to fight atheism and skepticism has not succeeded.
Only his empiricism left its mark on the future.

The real

goal of Bishop Berkeley’s philosophy has not been attained.
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